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Articles
"Bread for the Poor":
Access to Justice and the
Rights of the Needy in India*
MARC GALANTERt & JAYANTH

K.

KRISHNANf

India is rightly acclaimed for achieving a flourishing constitutional
order, presided over by an inventive and activist judiciary, aided by a
proficient bar, supported by the state and cherished by the public.
At the same time, the courts, and tribunals where ordinary Indians
might go for remedy and protection, are beset with massive problems of delay, cost, and ineffectiveness. Potential users avoid the courts;
in spite of a longstanding reputation for litigiousness, existing evidence suggests that Indians avail themselves of the courts at a low rate,
and the rate appears to be falling.' Still, the courts remain grid*

Parts I and II of this Article consist of a modified excerpt from Marc Galanter & Jayanth K.

Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, at IO4-i6 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C.
Heller eds., 2003).
t Centennial Professor of Law, The London School of Economics, and the John and Rylla
Bosshard Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, The University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. For their insights and comments, the Authors thank Upendra Baxi, Rajeev Dhavan, Ken Gallant, Erik Jensen, Julia Eckert, Michael Anderson, Keith Mackiggan, Sally Merry. and Clark Cunningham. The Authors also express
gratitude to Ranbir Singh and Ghanshyam Singh as well as to the Department for International Development (United Kingdom), which provided funding for this research.
I. Although reliable data are scarce and the state of record keeping makes collecting them a
daunting task, there are some bits to suggest that India is among the lowest in the world in per capita
use of civil courts. Some years back, Professor Christian Wollschl~iger presented a comparison of the
per capita rate of filing of civil cases in some thirty-five jurisdictions for the ten-year period between
1987 and 1996. Annual rates of filing in courts of first instance per iooo persons ranged from 123 in
Germany and ii in Sweden at the high end to 2.6 in Nepal and 1.7 in Ethiopia at the bottom. Since
no national figures are available for India, Professor Wollschliiger included in his comparison figures
on Maharashtra, one of India's most industrialized states, whose capital (Mumbai or Bombay) is India's financial center. Maharashtra ranked thirty-second of the thirty-five jurisdictions with an annual
per capita rate of 3.5 filings per iooo persons. Of course, it is true that Wollschliger looked only at a
single state and one ten-year period, and there is a question as to how representative his finding is for

[789]

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:789

locked.' There is wide agreement that access to justice in India requires
reforms that would enable ordinary people to invoke the remedies and
protections of the law. In this study we focus on an innovative forum, introduced just twenty years ago, which has enjoyed substantial governmental and judicial support and is endorsed and promoted, indeed given
pride of place by influential elites, as a promising avenue of access to jusIndia overall. But there is no reason to think that Maharashtra has less litigation than India as a whole,
since the data point to a general correlation of court use with economic development. See Christian
Wollschliger, Exploring Global Landscapes of Litigation Rates, in SOZIOLOGOE DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERHARD BLANKENBURG zuM 60. GEBURTSTAG (Jiirgen Brand & Dieter Strempel eds., 1998).
Also a recent Asian Development Bank (ADB) comparison of legal institutions in six Asian nations
offers rough confirmation both of the absolute level of court use in India and its low comparative rank.
Comparing India with China, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, and Japan, the ADB study found that in India,
the rate of filing cases in the lower civil courts was 1209 per million [1.2 per thousand] population in
1995. This is about one-third as many cases as Wollschliger found, which probably reflects the differences between Maharashtra and India as a whole as well as in the acuity of the researchers. The Indian
rate is only slightly higher than the Chinese, but the Chinese figure includes only commercial cases.
And the Indian rate is far lower than that of the other countries in the comparison. Malaysia, the country whose legal institutions most resemble those of India had a civil litigation rate in 1990 of 17,85o
cases per million [17.8 per thousand] population-roughly fifteen times that of India. India's placement at the bottom of this list is especially remarkable if we recall that Japan (3386.8 civil cases per
million [3-4per thousand of a population containing a much higher proportion of adults]) and Korea
(4,713 civil cases per million [14.7 per thousand], excluding family cases) are famously "unlitigious"
societies. Obviously, these comparisons are far from exact but, as rough as they are, they put into
question the notion that the Indian courts are victims of an excessively litigious population. See
KATHARINA PISTOR ET AL., THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTrrunONS IN ASIAN ECONOMic DEVELOP-

i96O-1995, 246 tbl.7.I8 (1999). Also consider Robert Moog's work, which has examined litigation rates in Uttar Pradesh from 1951 to 1976. (In 1976 the state stopped issuing these statistics.) He
found that per capita civil filings in all district level courts in Uttar Pradesh had fallen dramatically
from the early days of Independence, when there were 1.63 per thousand persons in 1951, to 1976
when there were only 0.88 per thousand. See Robert Moog, Indian Litigiousness and the Litigation
Explosion, 33 ASIAN SURV. 1136, 1138-39 tbl. 1 (1993). Going back even further, Oliver Mendelsohn
observes that "[t]here is now less litigation in absolute terms than there was in the nineteenth century
or first half of the... [twentieth] century and, therefore, far less relative to population." See Oliver
Mendelsohn, The Pathology of the Indian Legal System, 15 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 823, 849 (1981). The
continuation of this downward trend receives some confirmation from the ADB study which reported
that in "196o [there were] 610.4 court cases in civil matters per million people [o.6 per thousand].., but in 1995 there were only 507.9 [0.5
per thousand] civil cases."
This discussion as well as much of the subsequent discussion on the Indian legal system in Parts I
and II of the main text draw from a much longer study conducted by the authors. See generally Galanter & Krishnan, supra note *,at 96. What is presented in Parts I and II below is a modified excerpt
from that article. For the full, 20,000 plus word historical discussion consult the article, although note,
in that study the authors had not yet collected the original empirical data that are at the heart of this
Article and will be presented in Parts III and IV.
2. The courts appear to be heavily used because there are relatively few courts in India. Most
common law countries tend to have fewer judges than civil law countries. Consider the table in appendix A. Data we have collected suggests that India has only one-tenth to one-sixth the number of judges
per capita that are found in the developed parts of the common law world. See also Bibek Debroy,
Losing a World Record, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 14, 2002, at 23 (noting that there are "23 million
pending court cases-2o,ooo in the Supreme Court, 3.2 million in the High Courts and 20 million in
lower or subordinate courts").
MENT
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tice. This forum is the Lok Adalat, literally "people's court," and as the
name suggests it is promoted as having a different source and character
than the courts of the state. In fact, the Lok Adalat is a creature of the
state, but because of the pretension that it is not, it deserves examination
under the rubric of an alternative, non-state justice system. We suspect
that a number of the inhabitants of that category bear a similar ambivalent relationship to the state.
This Article will proceed in the following manner: Part I recounts
the post-Independence movement to establish village-based courts as a
key method of enlarging public access to justice. After discussing the setbacks this movement encountered, we contrast the top-down "public interest litigation" approach that emerged in the wake of the Emergency
period (1975-1977). In Part II we focus on how, beginning in the I98os,
judges and politicians returned to the captivating idea of settling disputes
in an indigenous, traditional manner at the grassroots level. During this
time, the concept of the Lok Adalat started gaining significant momentum, and we discuss the reasons why so many supported expanding this
alternative dispute institution throughout India. In Part III we present
findings from our preliminary observations of several different types of
Lok Adalats. We conclude that the claim that this forum offers participants speedy, fair, and deliberative justice needs serious reconsideration.

I.
A.

EARLIER "ACCESS TO JUSTICE" INITIATIVES

NYAYA PANCHAYATS: A FAILED ATTEMPT TO RECONSTITUTE JUSTICE
ALONG "INDIGENOUS" LINES

The Lok Adalat movement is a recent arrival on the "Access to Justice" scene. A movement to restore an indigenous legal system flourished
briefly in the years just after Indian Independence? Gandhians and socialists within the ruling Indian National Congress viewed the legal system inherited from the British as unsuitable to a reconstructed India, in
which faction and conflict bred by colonial oppression would be replaced
by harmony and conciliation. They proposed the displacement of modern
courts by restored traditional panchayats-a proposal that met with the
nearly unanimous disdain of lawyers and judges and the vitriolic scorn of
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, chair of the Constitution's Drafting Committee,
who sidetracked the push for panchayats into a non-justiciable Directive
Principle.4 As part of the Panchayati Raj [local self-government] policy of

3. Marc Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of "Indigenous" Law in India, in LAW AND SOCIETY
38-39 (Rajeer Dhavan ed., 1989) [hereinafter Galanter, Aborted Restoration].

IN MODERN INDIA

4. Id. at 40 n.I6. Article 40 states that: "The State shall takes steps to organize village panchayats
and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as
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the late 1950s, judicial, or nyaya, panchayats were established with jurisdiction over specific categories of petty cases.
Although these nyaya panchayats derived sentimental and symbolic
support from appeal to the virtues of the indigenous system, they were
quite different from traditional panchayats. They applied statutory law
rather than indigenous norms; they made decisions by majority rule
rather than unanimity; their membership was chosen by popular election
from territorial constituencies rather than consisting of the leading men
of a caste.6 Indeed the focus on the "village" panchayat represented an
attempt to recreate an idealized version of traditional society that emphasized democratic fellowship and ignored the caste basis of that society
and its justice institutions.'
Like their traditional counterparts, these official nyaya panchayats
encountered severe problems of establishing their independence of personal ties with the parties, enforcing their decrees, and acting expeditiously." They never attracted significant support from the villagers in
whose name they were established. Their caseloads declined steadily
while those of the courts continued to rise. In Uttar Pradesh, civil filings
in the nyaya panchayats fell from 82,321 in 196o to 22,912 in 1970-just

over four cases per nyaya panchayat.9 During the same period, civil filings in the Subordinate Courts rose from 74,958 to 86,749.0 One indicator of their demise is found in the experience of a researcher in Uttar

units of self-government." For a classic work on the appeal of "traditional" institutions, see LLOYD I.
RUDOLPH & SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN

INDIA (1967).

5. Upendra Baxi & Marc Galanter. PanchayatJustice: An Indian Experiment in Legal Access, in
3 AccEss TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds.,
1978); see also DR. R. KUSHAWAHA, WORKING OF NYAYA PANCHAYATS IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY OF VARANASi DISTRICT (Dr. L.M. Singhri ed., 1977).
6. KUSHAWAHA, supra note 5, at 31-63.
7. Reviewing the literature on panchayats. Robert Hayden concludes that there was no such
thing as a "village" panchayat, but only caste panchayats that, if sufficiently powerful locally, might
decide matters involving members of other castes as well. See ROBERT HAYDEN, DISPUTES AND ARGUMENTS AMONGST NOMADS 83-109 (1999); see also Louis DUMONT, HoMo HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE

SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 170-172 (1970) (noting that "we conclude that on the eve of British conquest, and excepting exceptional cases, there was no village panchayat as a permanent institution distinct from caste panchayats. There was a panchayat of the dominant caste of the village, and there
were meetings of ad hoc arbitrators or judges, of a temporary nature.").
8. Catherine S.Meschievitz & Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics of a
Moribund Institution, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 47-77 (Richard L.
Abel ed., 1982).
9. Baxi & Galanter. supra note 5,at 369 tbl.I.
Io.Id. at 371 tbl.2. See also KUSHAWAHA, supra note 5,at 99 (noting that in his study of Varansi
district in Uttar Pradesh, "during the eleven years (1960-70) only lO,449 cases were instituted before
289 Nyaya Panchayat in the whole of the district. This works out at an average of 4 cases per Nyaya
Panchayat per year.").
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Pradesh in the 1970s, frustrated by the rarity of nyaya panchayatsessions,
whose villager hosts graciously offered to convene one to facilitate her
research."
In little more than a decade, nyaya panchayatswere moribund. 2 It is
not clear whether they withered away because they lacked the qualities
of the traditional indigenous tribunals or because they displayed them all
too well. We believe that it was most likely because they represented an
unappetizing combination of the formality of official law with the political malleability of village tribunals. As Catherine Meschievitz summed it
up, "the N[yaya] P[anchayat] is thus a body of men... that handles disputes without regard to applicable rules and yet appears to villagers as
formal and incomprehensible."' 3
Nevertheless, the panchayat idea continued to exert a powerful attraction on legal intellectuals.' 4 The 1973 report of the Expert Committee
on Legal Aid, chaired by (and consisting of) Justice Krishna Iyer, a report that viewed itself as a radical critique of Indian legal arrangements,
speaks glowingly of nyaya panchayats as part of a larger scheme of legal
aid and access to the courts.'5 Panchayatsare endorsed as a method of incorporating lay participation into the administration of justice.' 6 But it is
clear that the justice in mind is "legal justice," the law of the land, and
not that of the villagers or their spiritual advisors.' 7 Panchayats are commended as inexpensive, accessible, expeditious, and suitable to preside

ii. Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 8,at 55.

Id. at 68-70.
13. Id. at 66. For a recent study that reviews how Nyaya Panchayats functioned in the years following Independence in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Karnataka, see S.N. MATHUR. NYAYA PANCHAYATS AS INSTRUMENTS OF JUSTICE 43-77 (I997) (concluding that although Nyaya Panchayats had
moments of promise, and at times even brought important legal services to those at the local levels,
ultimately they were plagued by inconsistent rulings, inept administrators, a weak infrastructure, de12.

lay, and a lack of full accountability to the public).

14. The attraction long antedates independent India. For an account of the love affair of reformers with panchayats, see CATHERINE S. MESCHIEVITZ, PANCHAYAT JUSTICE: STATE-SPONSORED INFORMAL
COURTS IN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY INDIA 18-21 (Disputes Processing Research Program, Institute for

Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Madison Law School, Working Paper 8:1, 1987).
15. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE & COMPANY AFFAIRS. DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL
AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID-PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE

(1973)

[hereinafter REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE].

16. Id. at 137-45; see also D.A. Desai, Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Role of Legal
Profession, Dispute Commissions and Family Courts and Nyaya Panchayats-Participatory Justice, in
ROLE OF LAW AND JUDICIARY IN TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY: INDIA-GDR EXPERIMENTS 80

(D.A. Desai

ed., 1984) ("Nyaya Panchayats offer a forum for participatory justice. Local village groups fully aware
of local problems, local solutions and local environment would tend to resolve the dispute in the spirit
of give and take, fairplay and equity.").
17. REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 145.
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over conciliatory proceedings."8 The panches envisioned by the report are
not village notables but superannuated judges and retired advocates.
The follow-up report of the Bhagwati Committee, charged with proposing concrete measures to secure access to justice for the poor, endorses a system of "law and justice at the panchayat level with a
conciliatory methodology."' 9 The argument was that panchayats would
remove many of the defects of the British system of administration of
justice, since they would be manned by people with knowledge of local
customs and habits, attitudes and values, familiar with the ways of living
and thought of the parties before them."0 Yet again the proposed
panchayats do not depart from established notions of law. There was to
be a presiding judge having knowledge of law, and the lay members were
to receive rudimentary legal training.' There would be no lawyers and
the tribunal would proceed informally, its decisions subject to review by
the district court." What is proposed is an informal, conciliatory, nonadversarial small claims court with some lay participation. This follow-up
report-written by distinguished activist judges dedicated to enlarging
access to justice-thus registered the appeal of the locally based "indigenous" forum under the guidance of an educated and beneficent outsider.
The catalyst in the formation of the Lok Adalat template was an influential 1976 article by Upendra Baxi, then India's most prominent legal
academic, well connected to activist circles within the judiciary. Baxi described a "Lok Adalat" run by Harivallabh Parikh, a charismatic Gandhian social worker in a tribal area of Gujarat. 3 This forum was
independent of the official law, both institutionally and normatively, although it bore no evident connection to traditional tribal institutions. As
in the Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati reports, the imagery of indigenous justice was combined with celebration of conciliation and local responsiveness under the leadership of an educated outsider. These visions of
paternalistic indigenous justice, published during the 1975-1977 Emergency, provided the basis for future developments. The end of Emergency Rule and the return to democracy in 1977 brought great ferment in

i8. Id.at 139.
19. See P.N. BHAGWATI, REPORT ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 33-34

(Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs, 1976).
20. Id. at 34-40.
21. Id. at3 6-4i.
22. Id. at 39.
23. Upendra Baxi, From Takrar to Karar: The Lok Adalat at Rangpur-A Preliminary Study, 1o
J. OF CONST. AND PARLIAMENTARY STo. 52 (976). Baxi reports that the term "Lok Adalat" was used
by participants in Rangpur (correspondence with Baxi, Mar. 13, 2002). His article may well be the
source of its wider and official use.
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the Indian legal world and inspired hope that institutions and organizations could be fashioned to protect the rights of the powerless. 4
B.

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:

"ACCESS"

THROUGH THE

Top

In the early I98os a small number of judges and lawyers, seeking
ways to actualize the Constitution's promises of justice-promises that
were so starkly unrealized in practice-embarked on a series of unprecedented and electrifying initiatives. These included relaxation of
requirements of standing, appointment of investigative commissions, appointment of lawyers as representatives of client groups, and a so-called
"epistolary jurisdiction" in which judges took the initiative to respond
proactively to grievances brought to their attention by third parties, letters, or newspaper accounts.25 Public interest litigation, or social action
litigation, as these initiatives are now called, sought to use judicial power
to protect excluded and powerless groups (such as prisoners, migrant laborers, and the environmentally susceptible) and to secure entitlements
that were going unredeemed. 6

24. See generally Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER 289 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., 1985); Smitu
Kothari, Social Movements and the Redefinition of Democracy, in INDIA BRIEFING 141-51 (Philip
Oldenburg ed., I993) (noting that following the Emergency there was an enthusiasm among civil rights
and public interest organizations that democracy could be ensured by the rule of law).

25. See Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limitations of the World's
Most Active Judiciary, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 140, 142, 147 (199o); P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and
Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 561, 570-75 (1985); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as
Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36 J. OF THE INDIAN L. INST. 302, 306-O8 (1994) [hereinafter
Dhavan, Law as Struggle].
26. For a recent and comprehensive account, see S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACnVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS (2002). The vast literature includes UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT IN THE EIGHTIES (s985); Marc Galanter, New
Patterns of Legal Services in India, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA, supra note 3, at 279-95
[hereinafter Galanter, New Patterns]; Baar, supra note 25; Baxi, supra note 24; Bhagwati, supra note
25; Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?
37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989); Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Supreme
Court: A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29 J. OF THE INDIAN LAW INST. 494 (198 7 ); Dhavan, Law as Struggle, supra note 25; Oliver Mendelsohn, Life and Struggles in the Stone Quarries of
India: A Case-Study, 29 J. OF COMMONWEALTH AND COMP. POL. 44 (199I); N.R. Madhava Menon, Justice Sans Lawyers: Some Indian Experiments, 12 INDIAN BAR REV. 446 (985): G.L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 66 (I99i); S.P.
Sathe, Judicial Activism, 1o J. OF INDIAN SCH. OF POL. ECON. 399 (1998); S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism
(II): Post-Emergency Judicial Activism: Liberty and Good Governance, IO J. OF INDIAN SCH. OF POL.
ECON. 603 (1998); Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing
in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIs. INT'L L.J. 57 (1994).
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At the same time the government and the bar moved to implement
the long-standing commitment to legal aid.2 7 A body was established, under the aegis of the Chief Justice of India, to coordinate the implementation of legal aid programs. And, most strikingly, there appeared a
number of innovative legal service schemes in which social action groups
for the first time sought to use law systematically and continuously to
promote the interests of various constituencies." For example, "middle
class" organizations, such as the Consumer Education and Research
Centre (CERC), emerged which attempted to address pervasive problems of public safety and consumer protection." With support from foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots groups
dedicated to protecting the rights of tribal people flourished, like
AWARE in Andhra Pradesh3 and the legal aid program at Rajpipla in
Gujarat." These organizations shared the conviction that law could be
used effectively to promote the well being of various segments of the
population.
These programs pointed beyond the prevailing "service" notion of
legal aid as episodic ad hoc representation in court by generalist lawyers.
Instead these new initiatives envisioned "strategic" operations of a scale,
scope, and continuity that enabled lawyers to acquire specialized expertise, coordinate efforts on several fronts, select targets, and manage the
sequence and pace of litigation, monitor developments, and deploy resources to maximize the long-term advantage of a client group.33 The no27. Implementation of legal aid before the Emergency was desultory. See generally G. Oliver
Koppell, The Indian Lawyer as Social Innovator: Legal Aid in India, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 299 (1969).

Among the many "populist" amendments to the Constitution enacted during the Emergency was a
new Directive Principle decreeing "equal justice and free legal aid." See INDIA CONST. (Forty-Second
Amendment) Act, 1976 sec. 8, 39A.
The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of
equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or
schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied
to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
Id.

28. The Committee on Implementation of Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS) was established in i98o
by the government of India with Supreme Court Justice (as he was then) P.C. Bhagwati as Chair of
Budget Activities.
29. See, e.g., Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 26, at 279-95; CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 97 (1998): D.L. Sheth & Harsh Sethi, The NGO Sector in India: Historical Context and
CurrentDiscourse, 2 VOLUNTAS 49 (1991).

30. See Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, India, Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC),
at http://fnf-southasia.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2004)
31. See SAKUNTALA NARASIMHAN, EMPOWERING WOMEN: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FROM RURAL

75-94 (1999) (describing the history and current activities of AWARE [Action for Welfare and
Awakening in Rural Environment]).
INDIA

32. See THE WEEK, at http://www.the-week.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
33. Galanter, New Patterns,supra note 26. at 279-95; Peiris, supra note 26.
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tion was to relieve disadvantaged groups from dependence on extraordinary, spontaneous personal interventions and thus to enable legal work
to be calculating and purposive rather than atomistic.
Public interest litigation has promoted important social changes,
raised public awareness of many issues, energized citizen action, ratcheted up governmental accountability, and enhanced the legitimacy of the
judiciary. 4 But judicially orchestrated public interest litigation has
proved only to be a frail vessel for enlarging access to justice by empowering disadvantaged groups.35 Among its limitations are an inability to resolve disputed questions of fact; weakness in delivering concrete
remedies and monitoring performance; reliance on generalist volunteers
with no organizational staying power; and dissociation from the organizations and priorities of the disadvantaged.36 While affirming and dramatically broadcasting norms of human rights, the courts frequently were
unable to secure systematic implementation of these norms."

II.
A.

THE SHIFT TO INFORMALISM

THE PROPONENTS

Apart from failures of implementation, judicially supported public
interest litigation aroused considerable resistance both from those who
opposed its program and from those who were discomfited by the recasting of the judicial role." However, there were some judges that avidly
promoted public interest law and, as we noted earlier, they too were entranced by the image of informal conciliatory justice brought to the
masses by the charismatic or expert outsider. In his 1976 report, Justice
34. In 2002, Professor S.P. Sathe published a detailed study documenting how the environment,
the rights of women and minorities, the rights of the ill and poor, and others all received important
protections as a result of public interest lawsuits filed by rights-conscious activists. See SATHE, supra
note 26,at ch. 6.

35. See generally AGRAWAL, infra note 37.
36. See Epp. supra note 29, at 97-98; GALANTER, New Patterns, supra note 26, at 279-82: Smitu
Kothari, The Human Rights Movement in India: A Critical Overview, in RETHINKING HUMAN RIGHTS:
CHALLENGES FOR THEORY AND ACTION 83, 92-99 (Smitu Kothari & Harsh Sethi eds., i99i); Cunningham. supra note 26, at 5o6-07.

37. For empirical support for these two sentences, see EPP, supra note 29, at chs. 5-6 (noting how
the public interest litigation docket of the Supreme Court, contrary to the conventional wisdom, failed
to increase significantly between 196o and 199o. Epp argues that the top-down approach in promoting
public interest lawsuits only went so far, due to the limited resources grassroots public interest advocates had in bringing such cases in the first place). For an earlier critique of public interest litigation.
see S.K.AGRAWAL, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA: A CRITIQUE (1985); ARUN SHOURIE, COURTS
AND THEIR JUDGMENTS: PREMISES, PREREQUISITES, CONSEQUENCES (2OO1);

Mendelsohn, supra note 26, at

46.
38. AGRAWAL, supra note 37, at 10-13 (identifying several Supreme Court judges who have expressed "a not-too-friendly posture to [public interest litigation]").
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Bhagwati, the foremost judicial proponent of public interest litigation,
proposed one-day forums to settle pending cases.3 9
As the surge of public interest law activity leveled off, the reform
energies that had fueled its growth found new channels. Where prominent judges had been patrons and instigators of public interest litigation,
their successors have become promoters of Lok Adalats. The dominant
themes of "reform" have become informality, conciliation, and alternative institutions rather than vindication of rights through adversary processes in mainstream adjudicative institutions.' As the name suggests
(again, literally, "people's court"), its sponsors seek to present it as indigenous and traditional." The promoters of the official nyaya panchayats in the 1950s were eager to present them as a continuation of the
historical panchayat institution. Similarly, the promoters of Lok Adalats
stress their indigenous character and "rich tradition," even though they
have little resemblance to earlier institutions.4" (Ironically, Harivallabh
Parikh had regarded the Lok Adalat at Rangpur as an innovative rather
than traditional forum.43 )

39. See P.N. BHAGWATI, supra note 19, at 41-42.
40. Id. Part of the appeal of the Lok Adalats to judges may be that it reduces-all but eliminates-the role of lawyers in reform.
41. This institution goes by various appellations in different localities (settlement camp, settlement mela, lok nyayalaya, janata nyayalaya, neeti mela, etc.) but we use Lok Adalat throughout since
it is the most common name and the one given official recognition in the Legal Services Authorities
Act, 1987 (amended 1994). For a critical assessment, see Sarah Leah Whitson, "Neither Fish, Nor
Flesh, Nor Good Red Herring" Lok Adalats:An Experiment in Informal Dispute Resolution in India,
15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 391 (1992). Empirical accounts of the working of Lok Adalats are
rare, but see Robert S. Moog, Conflict and Compromise: The Politics of Lok Adalats in Varanasi District,25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 545, 552-64 (1991); Gene Kassebaum, ADR in India: The Lok Adalat as an
Alternative to Court Litigation of Personal Injury and Criminal Cases in South India 5 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Authors).
42. See generally YOGESH MEHTA, LOK ADALATS AND PUBLIC INTEREST LMGATION (Ahmedabad:
Gujarat State Legal Services Authority, 2000). An extended description of Lok Adalat organization
and operations, embedded in a full-blown ideological account of Lok Adalats as a people's movement
establishing contemporary versions of ancient popular courts, may be found in SUNIL DESHTA, LOK
ADALATS: GENESIS AND FUNCTIONING: PEOPLE'S PROGRAMME FOR SPEEDY JUSTICE (1995). In a similar
vein, a team of Indian and American court reformers describe their reforms as "preserving and supporting formal litigation as a means of last resort, while simultaneously restoring and modernizing
consensual dispute resolution processes often utilized in pre-colonial society." Hiram E. Chodosh et
al., Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the Adversarial Process, 30
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 58 (1997-1998). Earlier they note that "Lok Adalats resemble the traditional panchayat system of five village elders acting as arbitrators for local dispute resolution." Id. at
41, n.130. But panchayatswere not composed of village elders, rather of caste elders; depending on the
circumstances they were no more arbitrators than mediators or legislators, and, notwithstanding the
name, there were not necessarily five.
43. Interview with Upendra Baxi, Professor of Law, University of Warwick, Warwick, Eng. (May
20, 2003).
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THE "CHARACTER TRAITS" OF LOK ADALATS

The early Lok Adalats approximated a standard template, although
as we shall see there are many new variations. Cases on the docket of a
local court (or tribunal) were, with the consent of one or both of the parties, transferred to a Lok Adalat list. 44 At an intermittent one-day
"camp," typically on a weekend day, attended by judges and other officials and promoted with considerable hoopla, the cases are called before
a mediator or panel of mediators. 4 The mediators are typically retired
judges or senior advocates.46
The first Lok Adalat was held in i982. 47 As of March 1996, some
13,o6i had been organized nationwide and some 5,738,000 cases were resolved there (about 440 per Lok Adalat). 48 Twenty-one months later the
total had risen to some 17,633 Lok Adalats and 6,886,ooo cases settled.49
That means than in the twenty-one-month period, 4572 Lok Adalats
were held - some 218 per month or 2600 per year and that approximately
1.148 million cases were resolved (about 251 per Lok Adalat.) Unpublished data from the National Legal Services Authority shows that as of
the end of 1999, 49,415 Lok Adalats were held with 9,720,289 cases being
settled (about 197 per Lok Adalat). ° By November 30, 2001, there were
iio,6oo Lok Adalats that had settled 13,141,938 cases (about 119 settled
per Lok Adalat)." It is unclear whether this seemingly continuous drop
in the number settled per Lok Adalat is due to the increasing number of
Lok Adalats, less success in achieving resolution, fewer cases, smaller
numbers of mediators, or more difficult and complex cases. There appears to be considerable regional variation. In the state of Gujarat from
March 1982 to the beginning of January 2000, 14,766 Lok Adalats were
held; nearly 90% of all cases "dealt with" were settled.52 In contrast, dur-

44. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (amended 1994). See also K. Ramaswamy, Settlement of Disputes Through Lok Adalat Is One of the Effective Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) on
Statutory Basis, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUION: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS i00 (P.C. Rao &
William Sheffield eds., 1997); Moog, supra note 41, at 554.
45. ROBERT S. MOOG, WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SUPREME: ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL
COURTS IN INDIA 135-38 (1997); Ramaswamy, supra note 44, at 98.
46. Ramaswamy, supra note 44, at 98.

47. Id. at 96.
48. Id. at 102.

49. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Annual Report of Ministry
of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (July 2, 1998), available at http://pib.nic.in/focus/foyr98/fOO 7 99 /
FOco2o798I.html.
50. Data obtained from the National Legal Services Authority (NLSA), New Delhi, December
2001. We presume that the data are from 1982 onwards; however, no official at the NLSA was able to
confirm this point nor give us a reliable starting date as to when the data were first collected.
51. Id.
52. THE GUJARAT STATE LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY: NYAYA PATH, December 2000, at 114.
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ing the first quarter of 2001, 651 Lok Adalats were conducted in Kerala
with only 39% of the cases settled. Clearly there is much variability here
and a larger empirical examination of these patterns is required before
any final conclusions can be made.
What sorts of cases are in Lok Adalats? One set of sophisticated
commentators tells us that Lok Adalat cases are "limited to auto accidents and family matters."53 But the dockets are considerably more varied, including vast numbers of ordinance violations and minor criminal
cases. While dockets vary from one place to another, generally they are
shaped to capture cases involving the poor. Lok Adalats, says one proponent, "specially cater to the needs of weaker sections of society."54
They are for "poor people," especially for petty non-contested cases.55
Many proponents of Lok Adalats see them not as a species of court reform but as a species of legal aid, one particularly suited to the poor, oppressed, and female. Like judicially inspired public interest law, the
theme is bountiful caring for the weak, but the movement is centered not
around eminent judges and prominent lawyers, but district judges, social
workers, and local advocates.
Lok Adalats are typically not able "to attract cases with heavy financial stakes or important civil litigation. Private litigation [has] remained
totally outside the ambit of Lok Adalats. '' 1 6 The Lok Adalat device has
occasionally been used for mass settlement: resolving two separate takings cases where residents of two different areas received approximately
1.5 billion and i86.8 million rupees respectively;57 and more recently
sugar cane growers and laborers were awarded 12 million rupees in a
Lok Adalat brokered settlement. 8
In terms of how frequently it meets, originally the term Lok Adalat
was used to refer to a transitory forum, staffed by volunteers and convened from time to time. It has grown to encompass a continuing institution with fixed location and personnel.
Permanent Lok Adalats [that] have.., been introduced in the various
Government departments that provide services ...[including] the
telephone companies, the electricity board, the municipal corporations,
the city development authorities and the insurance companies....Today Lok Adalat-type mechanism is being invoked by Gov53. Chodosh et al., supra note 42, at 43.
54. P.C. Rao, Alternatives to Litigation in India, in ALTERNATVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: WHAT IT IS
AND How IT WORKS, supra note 44, at 27.
55. Paras Diwan, Justice at the Door-Step of People: The Lok Adalat System, 78 ALL INDIA REP. J.

850 991).
56. P.C. Rao, supra note 54,at 27.

57. Ramaswamy, supra note 44, at 97.
58. Id.
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ernment Departments and public sector agencies to settle pension and
provident fund claims, bank debts, consumer grievances and similar
small claims of a civil or revenue nature:
The purpose of these permanent Lok Adalats "is to achieve the
resolution of petty disputes between a citizen and such departments before they reach the courts." ' In Part III, we will discuss permanent "in
house" Lok Adalats in more detail.
While proponents of Lok Adalats stress their participatory character, it is clear that the form of participation envisaged for poor claimants
or defendants is reception of the guidance of their betters. The tribunal is
to consist of "judicial officers of the area and.., educated social workers,
law college teachers and retired judicial officers",6' They will give the
poor "appropriate guidance.",6' This picture seems to be confirmed by the
knowledgeable reformers who tell us that in Lok Adalats, resolutions are
fashioned by the evaluative views of the mediators, rather than through
negotiations by the litigants. 63 Others have sardonically described adjudication in Lok Adalat as "banyan tree justice." 6'
C.

DISCOVERY AND AWARD-SEULEMENTS

How does the Lok Adalat deal with disputed questions of fact?
Early on, one proponent boasted "[tihere will be no necessity for witnesses or examination or cross-examination, to produce legal documents
or present case law." 6' Other accounts suggest that controversy about
facts, and perhaps about norms, rarely intrudes when Lok Adalats are
sitting. Cases may be "already compromised by the persuasion and efforts of judges and advocates alike, for the purpose of being placed before the Lok Adalats." 66 There may be a "pre-Lok Adalat conference in
which parties are approached by the legal67aid team and discussions about
the pros and cons of the case take place."
59. N.R. Madhava Menon, Lok Adalat: An Indian Contribution to World Jurisprudence,SOUVENIR, at 56, 57.

60. S.P. Barucha, Keynote Address, SOUVENIR at 18-I9.
6i. K. Gupteswar, The Statutory Lok Adalat: Its Structure and Role, 30 J. OF THE INDIAN L. INST.
174, 179 (1988).
62. Mahabaleshwar N. Morje, Lok Nyayalaya: A Place of Justice for Common Man in Changing
Society, 71 ALL INDIA REP. J. 68, 69 (1984).
63. Chodosh et al., supra note 42, at 41 r.x30.

64. This reference dates back to the early i98os when it is said that one of the first Lok Adalats
took place under a banyan tree in Gujarat. There is even evidence that this tradition has continued.
For a recent account of a "banyan tree" Lok Adalat, see Yogindra Gupta, Mishap Victim Gets Rs. 2.25
Lakhs, TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 24, 1999, available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/i999/ 9 9 apr25/
haryana.htm.
65. MorJe, supra note 62, at 68.
66. Virendra Singh Barhat,Judicial Courts v. Lok Adalats, 74 ALL INDIA REP. J. 5,6 (987).
67. Diwan, supra note 55, at 87.
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Generally, the largest cases in Lok Adalats are claims by accident
victims under the Motor Vehicle Act. This is the only type of case
counted separately and statistics are compiled of the amount of compensation awarded in these cases. Thus, the Ministry of Law stated at the
end of 1997 that some 349,710 motor vehicle accident claims had been
resolved by Lok Adalats and some rupees i I6o crores awarded (this is an
average award of rupees 3 3 ,I 9 O). Our data from the National Legal Services Authority show that by the end of November 2001, 825,255 of these
cases had settled at an average award of 39 ,43 2 .69 Lok Adalats therefore
resolved over io,ooo motor accident cases per month during the last four
years (475,545 in forty-seven months from January 1998 to the end of
November 2001)-and at higher amounts.
Gene Kassebaum's study of Lok Adalats in Karnataka from 1986 to
late 1988, found that about sixty-two percent of the cases were motor accident claims.7" Since the claimants in motor accident cases are typically
passengers or pedestrians and the defendants are typically companies or
government agencies, these matters "tend to be contests between the
relatively rich and the relatively poor, the powerful and the weak."" The
sessions observed by Kassebaum were organized so that all the cases involving claims against a particular insurer or transport company were
placed before the same panel, a considerable convenience to these defendants. The parties in these Karnataka Lok Adalats were represented
by advocates-although advocates were excluded in Uttar Pradesh Lok
Adalats described by Robert Moog.72 Most cases were settled after brief,
68. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, supra note 49. See also The Banyan Tree: Volume
II-Bringing Change. Section I: The Basis and Framework of the Legal System in India, available at
http://healthlibrary.com/readingbanyan2/5sectionl.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004), discussing how in
the state of Andhra Pradesh, since t986, claimants have received over Rs. 44 lakhs in payments from
automobile insurance companies. But see Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Government of
India, Performance of Lok Adalats (Feb. 21, 2000), available at http://pib.myiris.com/textfile/search/
article.php3?&filename=../press/D26581.htm&srch=motor, evaluating the overall performance of Lok
Adalats. The site states that between 1985 and 2000 "42,477 Lok-Adalats were organised in different
parts of the country where 90,74,971 cases were settled. In 4,88,669 motor accident claims cases, compensation amounting to rupees 2054,56,21,491 has been awarded." However, from this latter site it is

unclear if of the 9,074,971 cases, only 488,669 were motor cases, in which cases the actual percentage of
all cases being motor accident cases would be seemingly low, or whether there were other motor cases
that did not settle.
69. Data provided to Authors by the National Legal Services Authority.
70. Gene Kassebaum, supra note 41, at 5. Figures are for all Lok Adalats held in the state from
June t986 to mid-November 1988. Kassebaum observes that "the big cities use the Lok Adalat to dispose of vehicle accident claims, the small towns and taluks use Lok Adalat to settle long pending
criminal and other civil cases. The medium size cities do some of each." Id. at 16. See also MOOG, supra
note 45, at 135-46 (describing Lok Adalats in Uttar Pradesh with dockets made up almost entirely of
criminal and revenue cases).
71. Kassebaum, supra note 41, at 7.
72. Moog, supra note 41, at 554.
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often perfunctory, negotiations that focused on the quantum of damages.73
The amounts awarded in Lok Adalats are arguably quite small. In
the 13,553 cases resolved in Karnataka from 1986 to 1988 (of which 8537
were motor accident cases), the average settlement was rupees I4,758. 74
This is only a small fraction of the arguably inadequate average damages
awarded to claimants who persevere to fight their cases through the
courts. A sample analysis some years back of the recoveries in motor accident cases reported in the most comprehensive and widely circulated
set of Indian law reports, the All India Reporter, shows that, at least for
1986, the average recovery in the thirty-one cases for which data was obtainable was rupees 48,376. 75 Of course, the cases that were fought all the
way to a High Court could be expected to involve more severe injuries
on the average than those brought to a Lok Adalat.
Forums similar to Lok Adalats are conducted by voluntary groups as
well as by the courts. For example, the principal activity of the People's
Council for Social Justice (PCSJ) in Kerala, is conducting Neeti Melas
(festivals of justice). Staffed largely by retired judges and court personnel, PCSJ urges people to avoid the courts and avail themselves of its
services instead Rather than a departure from the official norms, it
proposes to give disputants' access to a purer, conciliatory, nonadversarial forum for the application of those norms." In fifteen years
the PCSJ has conducted 227 Neeti Melas and has settled over 8ooo motor
accident cases. 78

73. Kassebaum, supra note 41 (reporting that fifty-four percent of the cases that appeared at the
Lok Adalat reached a settlement).
74- Id. at 15, 35.
75. This analysis was performed ky Mary Versailles, J.D., University of Wisconsin, class of 199o.
In three other motor vehicle cases, recovery was confined to the statutory "no fault" award of Rs.
15,ooo for death and Rs. 7500 for permanent disability. If three cases are included, the average recovery is reduced to Rs. 44,769.
76. See http://www.councilforjustice.org, which is the website of the organization.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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PRELIMINARY (PRE-FIELDWORK) DATA ON LOK ADALATS

The motor accident cases that figure so prominently in the caseload
at the Lok Adalats, governmental and voluntary, are not cases diverted
from the rigidities of ordinary unreformed civil proceedings. Instead they
are cases diverted from a "reformed" and "streamlined" sector of the
court system,79 the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, themselves established to provide expeditious proceedings with no court fees and some
compensation available without a showing of fault. This accentuates the
point that Lok Adalats should not always be considered as providing additional access to justice: While some of the Permanent Lok Adalats may
address claims that have not yet been brought to a court or tribunal,

overall the Lok Adalat docket is made up of cases that have already been
brought to another forum. Lok Adalats do not provide new facilities for
the vast portion of potential claims that are discouraged by court fees,
the cost of lawyers, the prospects of delay, and paltry recoveries. More
systematic data are needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn,
but from the information presently available to us, it appears that the
main work of Lok Adalats is to provide a truncated process for some of
those few who do attempt to utilize the courts.
Just five years after the judiciary began to sponsor Lok Adalats, Parliament enacted The Legal Services Authorities Act of 1987, which was
amended in 1994 and then again in 2002.' The Act visualizes a regime of
Lok Adalats with jurisdiction over "any matter,"'" composed of judicial
officers and other qualified members, 8 authorized to proceed according
to its own procedures, which need not be uniform"' and to be "guided b
the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles."
Rather than an award in accordance with the law, the Lok Adalat is instructed to "arrive at a compromise or settlement."' The 1994 amendments to the Act mandate that the compromise "shall be final and
binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any
79. Whitson, supra note 41, at 426.
8o. The Legal Services Auth. Act, No. 39 of 1987, (1995) (amended 1994; amended

2002).

81. Id. at § 19(3).
82. Id. at § 19(2).
83. Id. at § 22(2).

84. Id. at § 20(4). This formula bears a striking resemblance to the "justice, equity and good conscience" that was the residual source of law in British India and elsewhere in the empire and remains
so today in India and elsewhere. Although the formula was designed to enable courts to appeal to
"sources of law other than English common and statute law," in practice its effect was "to introduce
conceptions which strongly resemble the general character of English law." J. Duncan M. Derrett, Justice, Equity and Good Conscience, in CHANGING LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 138, 150 (J.N.D.
Anderson ed., 1963).
85. Legal Services Auth. Act § 20(3).
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(The 2002 amendments reiterate this principle

under Section 22E.)

Lok Adalats differ sharply from the earlier nyaya panchayats. The
jurisdiction of Lok Adalats is not confined to specific categories of minor
matters, but can extend to "any matter." Instead of the popularly elected
panches, Lok Adalat officials are nominees of the state administration.
Where the panches could issue decisions, the Lok Adalat panelists-at
least until now-can only "determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement." ' Table i summarizes some of the differences between Lok
Adalats and various past and present forums for providing access to justice for everyday troubles and injuries.

86. Id. at § 21(2). Even with this provision we are uncertain whether "the so-called finality ...
[has] the effect of barring judicial review under articles 226, 227, 32, or 136 of the Constitution." See
Gupteswar, supra note 61, at 181 (writing before the 1994 amendments, arguing that judicial review
was still possible).
87. Id. at § 9(5).
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This campaign to institutionalize Lok Adalats comes in spite of (and
perhaps because of) the fact that little is known about their performance.
One serious issue that immediately comes to mind is whether this "informalism" disadvantages weaker parties. The few available accounts
raise a host of serious questions. For example, how genuine is the "consent" by which the parties consign their cases to Lok Adalats? Robert
Moog portrays pressures on officials to produce large numbers of cases
for Lok Adalats, leading in some instances to the institution of criminal
cases for the purpose of having them resolved there.' Also, cases that
have in effect been resolved in the courts are assigned to Lok Adalats to
inflate the total of resolutions there.'s Clearly, there are career incentives
for officials to produce the cases and settlements desired by their superiors. Beyond this, there are questions about the quality of the process:
Are the issues salient to the parties ventilated? Are the merits of their
cases effectively presented? Can the forum probe and resolve conflicting
assertions of fact? Do the resolutions embody legal standards? What is
the procedure for enforcing decisions? How regularly are decisions enforced? How do the outcomes compare with the parties' legal entitlements? Are outcomes reasonably consistent with one another?
Apart from these questions about the resolution of specific cases,
there are questions about the general effects of the diversion of these
claims to Lok Adalats. ° Does the diversion diminish the deterrent effect
of awarding damages? Does it diminish the supply of precedents and impede the development of tort doctrine and expertise that are responsive
to India's new industrializing economy? If it relieves the courts to do
other things, what do they in fact do? Does it encourage or discourage
preventive measures by frequent injurers (e.g., bus companies) and their
insurers? Neither those who operate Lok Adalats nor those who promote them have displayed much interest in systematic assessment of the
quality of their performance. Such assessment is essential to ascertain
whether the results justify the expenditures and commend these initiatives over others.9" Assessment involves comparing the performance of

88. MOOG, supra note 45, at 138-46; Moog, supra note 41, at 557-65.
89. MooG, supra note 45, at 138-46; Moog, supra note 41, at 557-65.
9o. The following set of questions listed in the text presuppose that litigants are economically rational actors. Of course, though, other considerations may also come into play such as family honor or
potential opportunities that accompany delay. We are sensitive to these other "non-rational" incentives, but for an overall discussion of "general effects" associated with litigation. See Marc Galanter,
The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 117-42 (K. Boyum & L.
Mather eds., 1983).
91. On the formidable conceptual and methodological problems involved in evaluating alternative methods of dispute resolution see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: JudicialPromotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994).
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the Lok Adalats with the aspirations their promoters have for them. So
far, what is remarkable is how modest these aspirations are.
Proponents of Lok Adalats, like earlier reformers, claim to draw on
the legacy of panchayats. But as Table i summarizes, they are distinct
from traditional panchayats in virtually every respect: they operate in the
shadow of the official courts; they are staffed by official appointees
rather than communal leaders; they apply some diluted version of state
law rather than local or caste custom; they arrange compromises instead
of imposing fines and penances backed up by the sanction of excommunication. Nor can Lok Adalats be viewed as a continuation of the push
for nyaya panchayats that peaked in the 195os. The proponents of nyaya
panchayats sought to provide a convenient, accessible, understandable
forum that would encourage popular participation, express popular
norms, and promote harmonious interaction. They were unable to deliver on this, but the aim was to provide a system of justice superior to
that of India's British-style courts. In contrast, the virtues claimed for
Lok Adalats are their expeditiousness and lower processing cost.92 What
commends them is not that they deliver a superior form of justice, but
that they represent deliverance from the agony of litigation in a system
conceded to be terrible.
The Lok Adalats' achievement, then, is to provide an official process
for claimants to secure a portion of their entitlements without the aggravation, extortionate expense, inordinate delay and tormenting uncertainty of the court process. 93 To secure this, they yield up discounts.
Assume, for example, a motor accident claimant who would secure
Rs. 50,000 compensation [and accumulated interest from date of filing]
after an expensive ten-year struggle in the courts. Imagine that this same
claimant might be able to get half that amount at a Lok Adalat in just a
few months. 94 This is clearly a preferable outcome for the claimant, given
the legal costs avoided and given the appropriate discount for the futurity and uncertainty of the court recovery. Thus, the establishment of the
Lok Adalat arguably provides a significant benefit for a claimant in this
situation.
But, of course, this claimant is entitled not to the discounted future
value of his claim, but to the full present value. What makes the delivery
of the discounted amount a "benefit" is simply that the full entitlement
can be vindicated only by recourse to a disastrously flawed judicial system that, at best, can deliver it in ten years. Thus, the "benefit" conferred
See Shiraz Sidhva, Lok Adalats: Quick, Informal Nyaya, LEX ET JURis, Dec. 1986, at 36-41.
93. See Gupteswar, supra note 6I, at 174.
94. But see Diwan, supra note 55, at 85 (claiming that discounts are only five to ten percent of the
value of the claim).
92.
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by the availability of the Lok Adalat is a benefit only by virtue of the
enormous transaction costs imposed by the judicial system.95 And these
transaction costs impact differentially on different kinds of parties. Those
who are risk averse and unable to finance protracted litigation are the
ones who have to give the discounts in order to escape these costs; those
who occupy the strategic
heights in the litigation battle are able to com•
mand steep discounts. Since the sums awarded by the courts fall far
short of fully compensating the injured, the injured are triply undercompensated: first, by the inadequate level of compensation delivered by
the courts; second, by the high transaction costs; and finally by the discounts they must yield to avoid the infliction of these costs. And, as the
injured are under-compensated, injurers are under-assessed for the costs
they impose on society for their risk-creating behavior and underdeterred from persisting in injurious conduct.97
The establishment of Lok Adalats represents the use of scarce reform energies to create alternatives that are "better" than the courts; but
it is not necessary to be very good to be better than the ordinary judicial
system. The flaws of the system serve not as a stimulus to reform it, but
as a reason for setting up institutions to bypass it. Reformers take pride
in delivering needed compensation more expeditiously to some of the
victims. But the features of the system that make this discounted result
appear to be an advance go unexamined and unattacked. Lok Adalats
are then an instance of a debased informalism-debased because it is
commended not by the virtues of the alternative process but by avoidance of the torments of the formal institutional process.
6

III.

VISITS TO THE FIELD

During the latter half of 2002 and early and middle parts of 2003, we
observed a sample of Lok Adalats in one of India's most politically and
economically important states. 9 In this section, we discuss how our findings compare with the conventional wisdom on these dispute resolution
forums.99 As already stated, the Lok Adalat in India is not a homogenous
95. For purposes of the argument here, transaction costs include lawyers' fees, court fees, bribes
and other litigation expenses, uncertainty of outcome and uncertainty of execution if a favorable outcome is obtained.
96. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 119-20 (1974). See generally H. LAURENCE Ross, SETrLED OUT OF
COURT (1970).

Change, 9

97. For a general evaluation of how the injured and poor are treated by the Indian legal system,
see N.R. Madhava Menon, Legal Aid and Justicefor the Poor,in LAW AND POVERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS
(Upendra Baxi ed., 1988).
98. To protect the confidentiality of the people we observed and interviewed, we purposely withhold the name of the state.
99. Conducting the fieldwork for this study was Jayanth K. Krishnan.
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institution. There are many types and the numbers grow by the day. In
this section we discuss five particular Lok Adalats: what we might call a
General Lok Adalat that usually hears motor accident cases and family
law disputes; an Electricity Lok Adalat; a government Pension Lok Adalat; a High Court Lok Adalat; and a Women's Lok Adalat. (Because
there was minimal activity at the Women's Lok Adalat the day it was observed, we mainly discuss the activity of the others.) We were furthermore able to collect important (albeit incomplete) quantitative data on
the operation of several other types of Lok Adalats. As we shall see, although the subject matter within each of these Lok Adalats is distinct,
there are similarities in how these forums function. More evidence is required before drawing any firm conclusions; however, our data thus far
confirm our worries that the quality of Lok Adalat justice falls seriously
short of the aspirations of "Access to Justice" proponents.
A.

SETTING THE SCENE

Most of the observed Lok Adalats took place on a Saturday, beginning around ten in the morning and lasting anywhere from two to seven
hours. The Electricity, Pension, High Court, and Women's Lok Adalats
were held in moderately maintained, state government buildings, while
the first observed General Lok Adalat was conducted in a recently constructed, separate hall located adjacent to the district court. (A second
observed General Lok Adalat was held in a district court building.) In
most cases, retired justices from the state High Court chaired the judicial
panels; in the General Lok Adalats a current, chief district judge served
as head of that panel. The Legal Services Authority Act also mandates
that judicial panels of Lok Adalats include one social worker and one
lawyer or other legal expert and that one of the three members must be a
woman. As we discuss below, there was variation regarding adherence to
this requirement.
The Electricity, Pension, High Court, and General Lok Adalats each
had long lines of claimants who often waited hours before having their
cases heard. (The day the Women's Lok Adalat was observed, only
seven cases were on the court docket.) The rooms holding the sessions
were stuffy, crowded, and lacked air conditioning. Claimants typically sat
and listened for their names to be called by a government-employed Lok
Adalat clerk before approaching the judicial panel. Standing next to the
panel would be a court stenographer who, upon direction of the presiding judge, would write down for the record what the judge believed to be
the pertinent information regarding the case. The presence of lawyers
representing claimants varied depending on the Lok Adalat. In the General, High Court, and Women's Lok Adalats most claimants came accompanied by lawyers. In fact, as we will explain shortly, in the General
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Lok Adalat, there was a situation where the same lawyer represented
numerous bus passengers who were victims in a massive traffic accident.
In the Electricity and Pension Lok Adalats the vast majority of claimants
represented themselves. Most surprisingly, in the Electricity Lok Adalat,
another party that was present and advocating a position (usually against
the claimant) was the police. We discuss below how police participation
impacted this Lok Adalat.
B.

TYPES OF CASES HEARD AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION

i. The Pension and Electricity Lok Adalats
Although the Pension and Electricity Lok Adalats deal with matters
distinct from one another, similar patterns are present in how these two
forums operate. The Pension Lok Adalat handles cases brought by retired civil servants who are disputing the pension amount allocated to
them by the government department for which they worked. The Pension Lok Adalat also hears claims initiated by current civil service workers seeking a promotion or increased monetary compensation. A judicial
panel consisting of a retired High Court judge, the General Secretary of
the Retired Employees Association, and a practicing lawyer oversee
these matters. The Pension Lok Adalat was statutorily created by our selected state in 2001, as a "permanent and continuous"" body. According
to the presiding judge, "500 cases have been settled in the last year and a
half," in which each claimant received the requested amount from the
governmental department.'0 ' This statistic, however, is contrary to the information provided by the Pension Lok Adalat office. According to the
official data, as of December 12, 2002, 605 cases had been referred to the
Pension Lok Adalat, with only 214 reaching settlements. Three hundred
seventy-six cases were adjourned, three were returned to the regular
courts, and twelve had yet to be heard.

"

Irrespective of this disparity, the presiding judge of the Pension Lok
Adalat repeatedly expressed hostility towards the presence of lawyers in
these forums and noted that were it not for them, the number of settled
cases would dramatically increase. 3 "Lawyers are famous," the judge
commented to Krishnan, "for dragging on cases.""

But of the twenty-

three cases Krishnan observed only three claimants even came accompanied by lawyers. Moreover, in thirteen cases (none of which had lawyers
involved), the party guilty of being unprepared and delaying matters was
too. Language is from the state statute creating this Lok Adalat.
IoI. Interview with Presiding Judge of Pension Lok Adalat (Dec. 28,

2002).

Data were provided to Krishnan during his visit to the Pension Lok Adalat (Dec. 28,
103. Interview with Presiding Judge of Pension Lok Adalat, supranote ioi.
102.

104. Id.

2002).
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the government agency. In six consecutive cases, the state's education
department representative asked the panel for postponement, prompting
the presiding judge to shout, "Why the hell aren't you people ready? Is
this how you run things over there?" ' 5 (Nevertheless, the motion for delay in each case was granted.) And in that morning session, just three
cases were resolved, with the remaining postponed to another sitting.
The government's lack of preparedness also could be found in the
Electricity Lok Adalat. This forum was established in 2001 to settle disputes between consumers and the state electricity company."° According
to the presiding judge of the Electricity Lok Adalat, ninety percent of the
cases involve billing disputes-mainly claimants accusing the electricity
company of excess charges."°7 The remaining matters deal with the company seeking compensation from individuals that the company contends
have stolen electrical power. The day that Krishnan observed this Lok
Adalat twenty-five cases were on the panel's docket. Thirteen resulted in
a settlement while ten were postponed at the request of the company;
two cases did not reach any resolution and the parties agreed to litigate
these matters in the regular state court.
Aside from the government not being prepared in nearly half of the
cases in the Electricity Lok Adalat, there was another curious aspect to
this proceeding. Of the twenty-five cases on the docket for that day,
three involved the company making theft charges against individual consumers. Assisting the company in the presentation of its case to the twomember judicial panel was the police. Krishnan interviewed the police
representative at the Lok Adalat who explained the reason for law enforcement's participation. This official stated that typically, when the
company lodges a theft complaint against a private individual, protocol
requires that a formal report be filed with the police department.) 8 A
special police division investigates the complaint and if the charges are
substantiated, then these findings are released to the company. At that
point the company may pursue a civil liability claim in the district court,
but if it and the defendant agree, then they may bring the case to the
Electricity Lok Adalat for a speedier resolution.'" (The police reserve
the right to file criminal charges against the individual with the city
prosecutor.)
But the police's role does not end with the investigation of the theft
matter. As Krishnan observed, in the Electricity Lok Adalat the police
105. Presiding Judge, comments during Pension Lok Adalat (Dec. 28, 2002).

io6. The mission of this Lok Adalat is similarly set forth in the statute creating this body.
107. Interview with Presiding Judge of Electricity Lok Adalat, location withheld (Jan. 4, 2003).

io8. Interview with police official present at Electricity Lok Adalat (Jan. 4, 2003).
to9. Id.
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representative served as the lead advocate for the company. This official
would explain the case to the judicial panel, question the defendant on
the specifics of his actions, and make penalty recommendations. Meanwhile, none of the defendants/consumers Krishnan observed had legal
representation, nor were they able to present adequate responses to the
satisfaction of the judicial panel or to the police. As the police representative explained to Krishnan, "because we are familiar with these types
of matters, it is quicker and better if we [rather than the company] deal
with these cases ..... These criminal matters in the Electricity Lok Adalat,
however, were not the only cases in which the police were involved. In at
least a half dozen billing disputes the police representative argued on behalf of the company against the consumer. In the last case of the day, one
that happened to be the most heated dispute of all those on the docket,
the police official directly denounced the consumer for wasting the
panel's time and urged him to pay the bill once and for all, which the
consumer ultimately did. Even the presiding judge of the Electricity Lok
Adalat conceded in an interview following the proceedings that claimants may, at times, "feel somewhat intimated" with the police being present."' The police involvement in the Electricity Lok Adalat is
reminiscent of Dr. Julia Eckert's recent description of the Shiv Sena
courts in Maharashtra, where police officials there served not just as enforcers but also as interpreters and arbitrators of the law." 2
General Lok Adalats
Two different General Lok Adalats in two different cities, where in
each setting the respective chief judge served as head of the judicial
panel, were observed during the course of the field research. The first
General Lok Adalat observed was located in a district about twenty
miles outside of the capital city. The morning set of cases involved several divorce matters. Before even going to the Lok Adalat room, couples
would enter the presiding judge's private office, where their respective
lawyers presented the reasons for the divorce application. In this "preLok Adalat" hearing, the judge explained to the participants that his
main goal was to see if the marriage could be salvaged. "Especially if
there are children," he explained, "we want to try to do whatever we can
to achieve reconciliation..'' 3
The expectations of the parties, however, during these pre-Lok Adalat hearings were far different. In the observed cases, formal separation,
2.

IIo. Id.
i i i. Interview with Presiding Judge of Electricity Lok Adalat, supra note Io7.
112. Julia Eckert, Legal Pluralism, Legal Reality, and the Changing Modes of Policing in Mumbai
4 (2OOl) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
113. This comment was made to Krishnan while the parties were in the room (Aug. 17, 2002).
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not reconciliation, was the main priority of the parties. In one notable
case, a middle-class couple"4 came into the room accompanied by their
two young children and almost immediately began screaming at one another as well as to the judge. The wife accused the husband of having an
extramarital affair and emotionally abusing her, while the husband
sobbed that his wife had made a false criminal complaint against him,
which had resulted in his arrest. Throughout this whole episode, which
lasted nearly one-half hour, the children sat quietly crying while the lawyers unsuccessfully attempted to calm their clients down.
As this commotion was occurring, the presiding judge chatted with
the second author (Krishnan) intermittently about how he had seen this
couple now for the third time and how they still refused to try to reconcile." 5 At that point, the husband interrupted, yelling at the judge, "Sir,
please, reconciliation is not possible!" 6 Yet, the judge continued to explain that this type of "venting session" was good for the couple's emotional health."7 He then called the children over to sit next to him and
asked how they felt about their parents' fighting. Too nervous to speak,
the eight-year-old boy shrugged, while his five-year-old sister held her
brother's hand, continuing to weep. In a firm tone, the judge then noted
to the parents: "See-is this how you want your children to see you? Is
this nonsense you are fighting about really good for them? A boy and a
girl need both a mother and father-this fighting is not good at all."' "8
With that, the judge ordered the couple to attempt to work their problems out and to return next week if they could not resolve their differences.
As this family left, another family entered into the judge's chambers
also for a pre-Lok Adalat hearing. The claimants in this case were the
maternal grandparents of a seven-year-old Indian-American boy, whose
parents had been killed in a traffic accident near their home in Chicago
three years ago. Since the accident, the boy had been living with his maternal grandparents in our selected state, but the paternal grandparents
(the defendants) were seeking to establish some set of custodial rights.
As opposed to the previous divorce case, here the lawyers for the parties
played an active role, each explaining their case to the judge. The claimants' lawyer sought to have the judge issue a decree formally severing all
legal ties of the paternal grandparents to the boy. According to this lawyer, the only reason the defendants sought custody was because of a one
114. Both the husband and wife were civil service employees.
115. Interview with Presiding Judge of General Lok Adalat (Aug. 17, 2002).
116. Comment by husband made Aug. 17, 2002.
117. Interview with Presiding Judge of General Lok Adalat, supra note 115.
I18. Presiding Judge, comments during General Lok Adalat (Aug. 17, 2002).
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hundred thousand dollar life insurance policy that the boy had received
(in trust) upon his parents' death.
The judge noted to Krishnan that a case of this financial magnitude
was unusual for a Lok Adalat, and that this was one of the most emotionally trying matters he had ever seen."9 But he expressed annoyance
at how involved the lawyers were in this case. When the defendants' rawyer attempted to present his case, the judge shouted: "Let me ask you,
how many times did your clients visit the boy in the States? Were they
even ever a part of his life?"'.. When the lawyer tried to explain that the
paternal grandparents were only of modest means and therefore could
not afford to travel to the United States, the judge cynically responded,
"If this is so, how do they expect to take care of a little boy, now?"'
That the judge asked these questions was not so troubling, given that
the paternal grandparents admittedly had very little contact with their
son since a family rift had occurred some years back. Noteworthy, however, was the level of hostility the judge expressed towards these lawyers
who attempted to advocate on behalf of their clients. The judge ultimately proposed a tentative settlement between the parties, whereby the
claimants could supervise weekend visits to the defendants' residence
while the boy was on summer holidays. But because neither side was
comfortable with the proposal, the judge told them to return the following week for another meeting. Later over lunch, the judge stated to
Krishnan that the lawyers in this case were the ones who continued to
prevent an amicable solution.'22 Had they not been involved, he commented, an agreeable settlement more likely would have been reached.' 3
This disregarding attitude towards lawyers was particularly highlighted during the afternoon session where Krishnan observed a case involving twenty-six claimants who were seeking compensation from a
state-owned bus company for injuries they sustained during a violent
traffic accident. Assisting the district judge in the adjudication of this
matter was a social worker and another judge of that same court. The
victims were uneducated, rural villagers who, through their lawyer, accused the bus driver of gross negligence. On one side of a table separating the parties were several bus company officials and their lawyer; on
119. Interview with Presiding Judge of General Lok Adalat, supra note 115.
120.

Presiding Judge, supra note ii8.

i2i. Id.
122. Interview with Presiding Judge of General Lok Adalat, supra note 115.
123. This resentment towards lawyers was also expressed by a judge from the Women's Lok Adalat. This individual, a prominent lawyer before retiring two years ago, stated that in her Lok Adalat,
"lawyers are always up to no good." The Women's Lok Adalat deals almost exclusively with cases of
divorce, and as she noted, "things run so much more smoothly" when the parties come on their own
without counsel. Interview with Judicial Officer from Women's Lok Adalat (Jan. 5, 2003).
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the other side was the line of victims who all were represented by the
same lawyer. The claimants' lawyer presented each victim who one-byone told the three-judge panel of the injuries he/she incurred. The claimants' lawyer then provided to the panel medical reports and in some
cases x-rays of each victim's injuries. The panel reviewed the reports and
then the chief district judge held each x-ray up to the light and attempted
to decipher the seriousness of the injuries. When Krishnan asked if he
had medical training to read the x-rays, the judge noted that since he had
been involved in many of these types of cases in the past, he had developed a "knack" for this skill.'24
In terms of the settlements, the negotiations followed a definite pattern. The bus company proposed a figure, the claimants' lawyer (halfheartedly) countered, the bus company then stated another figure, and in
three-fourths of the cases observed, the district judge actively supported
the company's proposed amount. (In those matters where the judge did
not completely endorse the company's offer, he negotiated a settlement
where the final figure still came close to the company's second proposal.)
Three other observations merit mention. First, when the claimants' lawyer ultimately accepted the settlement, he would do so without even consulting the clients. Second, the bus company's lawyer rarely spoke during
any part of the proceeding; the company officials directly engaged in the
negotiations. And third, on average, each individual case took anywhere
between fifteen seconds to two minutes to resolve.
After the proceedings, Krishnan questioned the claimants' lawyer
about the assembly-line manner in which he handled these cases. Before
answering, the lawyer made it a point to note that professionally he
struggles to attract clients and is further hindered by his lack of legal experience.'25 One way he has sought to improve his contacts as well as his
professional capital is by working in Lok Adalats. Because Lok Adalats
are promoted by people who the lawyer perceives as having the power
and the ability to help him professionally, he makes it a point to work in
these forums. Eventually, however, he did confess that the powers-thatbe, he felt, evaluated his productivity (and that of the Lok Adalat) on the
number of cases disposed during a Saturday session.'26
In July 2003, judges from the capital's Civil (District) Court Complex invited Krishnan to compare how their General Lok Adalat operated with what we just described. While there were some noticeable
differences between the two, more striking were the number of similari-

124. Id.
125. Interview with claimants' lawyer (Aug. 17, 2002).
126. Id.
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ties present. In terms of the differences, first, consider the physical setting of the Capital City General Lok Adalat. Unlike in the above example where there was a separate hall dedicated especially for dealing with
Lok Adalat cases, the City Civil Complex contained several courtrooms
where every Saturday one or more of these would be used for hearing
Lok Adalat matters. Litigants would line the walls both inside and outside of the courtroom waiting for a government "caller" to scream out
their names to proceed to the Lok Adalat bench. A long table, approximately four feet wide and fifteen feet long, would separate the petitioner
from the defendant and at the head of this table would sit the three-judge
panel, made up of a social worker, an advocate/lawyer, and civil judge.
Although these General Lok Adalat hearings would occur every Saturday, they could also be held several days during the week, if a matter
pending in the regular courts that was thought to be close to compromise
was diverted into this dispute resolution forum.
Another difference between the urban, General Lok Adalat and the
first one observed involves the role played by the chief district judge. We
saw that the first judge was hands-on and very micro-managerial. In contrast, the capital city's chief district judge acted more like a supervisor,
checking-in now and then to see how the judicial panel was functioning
and staying updated on its progress.'27 But even though this chief judge
appeared more detached, his impact and presence on the General Lok
Adalat remained quite significant. During Krishnan's observations it was
common for the judicial panel-minus the chief judge-to work for
about an hour or so attempting to settle various disputes. The majority of
matters coming before the panel included divorce cases, property disputes, and motor vehicle accident claims. Suddenly in the middle of a
case, the chief judge would walk into the room, where everyone then
would immediately stand to greet him with great respect. 8 He would go
over to the bench, ask for a summary of the case being heard, and then
take the lead in trying to bring this matter to a resolution. (The other
members of the judicial panel would feverishly change their seats to
make sure that the chief judge was front-and-center.)
From there, the chief judge would exhibit what one of the members
of the judicial panel told Krishnan was "great leadership.'. 9 For example, in the first case where he interceded, the chief judge listened to a
lawyer representing an injured factory employee state how his client was
not receiving worker's compensation because the employer had failed to
127. There were two separate observations made of this capital city General Lok Adalat. The first
occurred on July 19, 2003, and the second occurred on July 26, 2003.
128. This type of intervention occurred during both of Krishnan's visits.
129. Interview with Judicial Officer of General Lok Adalat (July 19, 2003).
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pay the necessary premiums. The opposing counsel responded that under
the law the employer was exempt from having to purchase this particular
type of insurance and thus was not liable for injuries suffered by any
worker. Visibly frustrated that the case was not being compromised, the
chief judge began scolding both parties' lawyers for their role in perpetuating this dispute. Speaking to the worker's lawyer, the judge stated:
"You know he [the employer] doesn't have the bloody money to pay
what you're asking. So why do you insist on not trying to work with
him?"' 3 And turning to the employer's lawyer, he declared: "Obviously
this poor guy is hurt and this happened at your client's plant. Don't you
feel some responsibility to do something?"' 3 ' He then dismissed the parties, ordering them to see if they could settle their case on their own and
to return next week if such compromise failed.
After they left the courtroom, Krishnan spoke separately to the lawyers for both sides. The worker's lawyer expressed great frustration that
the judge "did not even bother"'32 to look at the receipts of all the medical expenses incurred by his client. He noted that even if his client reduced his financial demands by one-half, there still would be no way the
worker could cover these costs on his own. "At least the other judges
[i.e., those on the original Lok Adalat panel] were listening to my client's
difficulties. We did not even get to make our case here."' 33 The em-

ployer's lawyer also was dismayed about what had just occurred. "How
can he [the employer] settle or reach a compromise if he has no money to
give? Why
we even bother to come here [to the Lok Adalat], I just don't
34
know."1

The resignation expressed by this second lawyer turned out to be a
rather common sentiment. Several lawyers stated that while on occasion
participating in Lok Adalats did bring about quicker settlements for their
clients, in most cases judges refused to take the time to study what often
were complex issues, examining, for example, important evidence in a
very cursory manner or simply not at all. Indeed, frustrated by what they
perceived as the heavy-handedness of the chief judge, four different lawyers interviewed said that they have begun to engage "quietly" in tactics
that they hope will eventually undermine the Lok Adalat process.'35 For
instance, after being lectured by the chief judge for not having his client
present in a property law dispute for now the third time, a reprimanded
130. Chief Judge, comments made in General Lok Adalat (July 19, 2003).
131. Id.
132. Interview with worker's lawyer (July 19, 2003).
133. Id.
134. Interview with employer's lawyer (July 19, 2003).
135. Interview with separate lawyer present at General Lok Adalat (July 19, 2003).
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lawyer pulled Krishnan aside telling him that he purposely instructed his
client not to show up at that day's Lok Adalat hearing. 36 Since the Legal
Services Authority Act, which governs Lok Adalats, requires that disputing parties sign onto all compromises reached, so long as this lawyer's
client continued to refuse to make himself available no pact could be finalized. The ultimate goal, the lawyer indicated, was to put this case back
into the regular courts, where he believed his client had the best chances
of success.'37

Another way that lawyers have exhibited this passive resistance ' is
by not showing up themselves to a Lok Adalat hearing. The following
week, for example, Krishnan returned to the City Civil Court where he
witnessed a divorce proceeding involving a Muslim couple. In India, religious law typically governs family law cases dealing with issues such as
marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. Thus, Hindu law applies to
Hindu couples, IslamiclShariatlaw applies to Muslim couples, Christian
law applies to Christian couples, and so on. Elsewhere we have detailed
how this system operates,'39 but for our purposes here it is important to
recognize that the Indian state courts are charged with administering the
relevant religious law.'4 ° When a case is brought before a Lok Adalat, the
same principle is present; the judicial panel is asked, for example, in the
case of a Muslim couple seeking a divorce to apply the norms set forth in
the Shariat.But oftentimes neither the judges nor the parties are familiar
with what can be complex provisions in the Shariatregarding divorce. In
these situations deference is frequently given to the lawyers who presumably have practiced for years in this area and are more familiar with
how the law should be applied. Yet without the lawyers present-as was
the case that Krishnan observed involving the Muslim couple petitioning
for divorce-the panel and the parties are reluctant to finalize a settlement that may not comport with the traditions of Islamic law. The result

136. Interview with "reprimanded" lawyer (July 19, 2003).
137. Id.
138. For a classic, academic discussion of how passive resistance is used, see generally

JAMES ScoTr,

WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORM OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1987).
139. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel,

34

L. REV. 98 (2000).
140. For a complete set of bibliographic resources on personal law in India, see id. For a selected
sample of citations, see J.D.M. DERRErr, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1968); GERALD LARSON, RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA: A CALL TO JUDGMENT (2o1); John Mansfield,
ISRAEL

The PersonalLaws or a Uniform Civil Code?, in RELIGION AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA (Robert
ed., 1993); SWAPNA MUKHOPADHYAY, IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: WOMEN IN LAW AND SOCIETY

Baird

(1998); Archana Parashar, Do Changing Conceptions of Gender Justice Have a Place in Indian
Women's Lives? A Study of Some Aspects of Christian Personal Law, in CHANGING CONCEPTS OF
RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA 140 (Michael R. Anderson & Sumit Guha eds., 2000).
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then is a postponement of the matter until lawyers for both parties can
make themselves available to the Lok Adalat.
Following the adjournment of this Muslim divorce case, Krishnan interviewed first the husband and then the wife. While the husband sidestepped the question of why his lawyer did not appear, the wife directly
stated that her lawyer had purposely not attended for fear that the wife
would not receive a fair hearing in this forum.' According to the wife,
her lawyer had little confidence that the judicial panel (particularly if the
chief judge was present) would show the lawyer the deference he believed he deserved.'42 The lawyer also apparently stated to the wife that it
would be the judge's biased beliefs that would dictate the outcome rather
than the principles of equity or law. Since the Lok Adalat lacked any enforcement power to make the lawyer attend, the plan was that eventually
the case (after going through several postponements) would be redirected to the regular state courts where the lawyer believed he would
have a better shot at obtaining a more favorable outcome for his client.'43
(It seems that the lawyer mentioned to the wife that the regular state
courts have over the past few decades expanded the rights of Muslim
women in divorce matters, beyond what traditionally has been allowed
for by the Shariat."")

141. Interview with Muslim wife (July 26, 2003).
142.

Id.

143. Id.
i44. For case law supporting this, see Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 362, 36566; Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, A.I.R. 198o S.C. 1730, 1736; Mary Roy v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1986
S.C. 1011, 1014; Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945,954. See also FLAVIA
AGNES, LAW AND GENDER INEQUALITY:

THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN INDIA (1999)

(Ullah v.

Uttar Pradesh, Writ Pet. 45 1993; Writ Petition 57 1993). For the third case, where a Bombay High
Court ruled that Muslim divorced women are entitled to maintenance payments beyond what is prescribed by the Shari'a. see Sultan Shahin, Ulema to Launch Campaign for Personal Law, TIMES OF INDIA 1999 (Internet edition) (1999). A decision by the Supreme Court in April 2003 illustrates the
Court's willingness, at least in an indirect manner, to reenter the debate over women's rights in family
law cases. In upholding a family court divorce decree that gave a Muslim woman more property rights
than are typically allowed under Muslim personal law, the Court refused to entertain the husband's
petition that family courts (which are special courts created under the Family Courts Act of 1984 but
are still part of the governmental judicial system and answerable to the Supreme Court) do not have
jurisdiction to render such a verdict. For a full discussion of this case, see J. Venkatesan, Family Courts
Can Decide Property Disputes, HINDU, Apr. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 189o986o. Also, in July
2003, the Supreme Court in overturning a Christian personal law dealing with inheritance, stated in
dicta that India should eventually move towards considering a uniform civil code. This statement from
Chief Justice Khare resulted in widespread protest by various religious minority communities as well
as a host of scholars, academics, and commentators. See SC Favors Uniform Civil Code, INDIA EXPRESS
(Internet edition), at http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/national/2oo3o723-I.html (July 23, 2003). The
Chief Justice has commented:
It is a matter of regret that Article 44 of the Constitution [which calls for the government to
endeavor towards a uniform civil code] has not been given effect to. Parliament is still to

March

2004]

BREAD FOR THE POOR

That lawyers are strategically acting in this manner is of no surprise
to members of the Lok Adalat's judicial panel or to the chief judge. "We
are not stupid,' 45 the chief judge told Krishnan. "We know what they are
doing and how they are trying to frustrate our efforts, but we do the best
we can and try not to bother with them."'' 6 In fact to illustrate how well
the Lok Adalat can function without lawyers, the chief judge made it a
point to highlight another divorce case that he personally settled. In this
matter, a Hindu couple from a rural village came before the Lok Adalat
to petition for a divorce. As in the Muslim divorce case described above,
neither party's lawyer attended the Saturday session. Nevertheless, the
chief judge, determined to broker a settlement, spent nearly twenty minutes listening to the complaints and demands of both the husband and
wife.
The main contested issue in this case involved alimony for the wife;
she was seeking more than the husband was willing to pay. Confused by
her unwillingness to reduce her demands by even one rupee, the judge
therapeutically asked the wife why she was so hostile and angry. The wife
responded by saying that the husband had flaunted his affair with another woman throughout the village, utterly humiliating the wife. At this
point the chief judge had what might be described as a "eureka" moment. He demanded to know from the husband why he had behaved in
this manner. "You are having a concubine and you don't even feel
ashamed?"'47 he inquired. "What you have done is very wrong, and you
need to compensate her [the wife] properly,'. 4 the judge stated. After
some further cajoling the husband reluctantly agreed to the wife's demands and thereafter the matter was disposed. The judge then, addressing Krishnan as well as about twenty students from a nearby law school
who were observing this session as part of their clinical training, emphasized two important morals of this particular episode. First, he said,
thanks to the Lok Adalat this case, which would have potentially lasted
for years in the regular courts, is now completed and the parties can go
on with their lives. Second, this matter was expeditiously resolved mainly
because there were no lawyers present. Lawyers, he asserted, would have
raised "useless"'4 " objections and made time-consuming, irrelevant argu-

step in for framing a common civil code in the country. A common civil code will help the
cause of national integration by removing the contradictions based on ideologies.

Id.
145. Interview with Chief Judge of General Lok Adalat, location withheld (July 26, 2003).

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Chief Judge, address to law students (July 26,2003).
Id.

Id.
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ments. Keep this in mind, the judge told the students, because they were
after all the next generation of India's best and brightest legal minds.
The discord that is present between judges and lawyers within both
the General Lok Adalats seems to reflect a deep tension that proponents
of this institution to date have not fully acknowledged. In the next section we turn to examining another type of forum, the High Court Lok
Adalat, where judge-lawyer hostility has similarly serious implications
for the claimants seeking to access justice.
3. The High CourtLok Adalat' °
The High Court Lok Adalat is an interesting creature. Established in
2000, it meets one weekday a month in a building located next to the
High Court that houses the state Legal Services Authority Commission."' This particular Lok Adalat seeks to dispose of the thousands of
cases that continue to backlog the High Court. The matters that typically
come before the High Court Lok Adalat are petty criminal cases that the
Indian penal code characterizes as compromise-able, or "compoundable." In American terms, the institution serves to facilitate plea bargains
between the state's public prosecutor and the petty criminal defendant.
(Where the victim is an individual, the public prosecutor generally consults with the victim before striking any deal.) There is a three-judge
panel that presides over the High Court Lok Adalat: a retired High
Court judge, along with two advocates.'52 As with the other Lok Adalats,
at least one member of the panel must be a woman, but the statutory requirement that the panel include a social worker is not strictly enforced.'53
On the day that Krishnan traveled to the High Court Lok Adalat,
sixteen cases were scheduled for hearing. Yet before the session began,
the presiding judge informed Krishnan that he was very skeptical of
reaching a settlement in any case. "These damn lawyers are just not
showing up,"' 54 he commented. "They are following the order of the
[state] Bar Council not to come and work in the Lok Adalat."'55 As it
turned out, half of the defense lawyers did attend that day's session with
their clients, but the proceedings were delayed because the public prosecutor arrived over thirty minutes late -much to the dismay of the presid-

150. The observation of this Lok Adalat by Krishnan occurred on July 30, 2003.

151. Interview with Presiding Judge of the High Court Lok Adalat (July 30, 2003).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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ing judge, who quietly remarked to Krishnan: "These lawyers are all
alike, regardless of who they work for. Delay is all they know."'' 6
Eventually the session began. The separate defendants had their respective counsel present and the judicial panel called each individual up
one-by-one. Six of the cases involved "excise" matters, or otherwise put,
state charges against a defendant for selling alcohol without a license. On
this issue of excise, the Indian Penal Code is both complex and technical.
Under some circumstances excise violations will be compoundable (e.g.,
when the amount of alcohol sold is under ten liters), while others will not
be.' 7 In five of the six cases, the violations were found to lie outside of
the High Court Lok Adalat's jurisdiction, much to the ire of the presiding judge who scolded the lawyers on both sides for not knowing this beforehand. Yet in every one of the cases that was dismissed, the judicial
panel scrutinized the statutes to see if there was any way of fitting the respective cases into one of the compoundable categories. In his eagerness
to find a way to resolve more than just one dispute, a judicial officernot on the bench but who happened to be visiting this session and serving
as an active advisor to the panel-stated in an exasperated voice, "I
really think if we read the provision this way, we can make this work." 58
If there was great frustration that almost all of the excise cases failed
to meet the penal law's compoundability requirement, then consider how
the panel reacted when a different type of case that could be settled, was
not. The last case of the day involved two defendants who already had
been convicted in criminal court of violating Section 354 of the Indian
Penal Code. That provision states that it is a crime to:
Assault or [use] criminal force to a woman with the intent to outrage
her modesty-whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman,
intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or
both.'5 9
Both of the defendants had been sentenced to a prison term and ordered to compensate the victim financially, but they were appealing their
156. Id.
157. Laws regulating liquor in India date back to 1944, when the pre-Independent state, under the
British Raj, passed the Central Excise Act of I944. Since 1944 some states have viewed the central
government's legislation as providing the floor or the minimum regulation, and thus have tightened up
restrictions accordingly.
i58. Judicial Officer, comments while observing High Court Lok Adalat (July 30, 2003).
159. INDIA PEN. CODE § 354. For a discussion of this matter, see Review of Rape Laws, March 2ooo,
LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA (Mar. 25, 2000), available at www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/rapelaws
.htm. The Centre for Social Research, a prominent non-governmental organization in India, has devoted considerable time to evaluating and critiquing the compoundability aspect of Section 354.
http://www.csrindia.org/ctogotodo.html.
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case to the High Court. On appeal the High Court affirmed the lower
court's prison sentence, however it recommended to the public prosecutor and the defense lawyers that they try to hammer out an agreement on
the issue relating to compensation.
Also present at this hearing was the assaulted teenage victim and her
older, very feeble father. The judicial panel summoned the two, along
with the public prosecutor and the defendants' lawyers to the bench. The
judges urged the parties to come to some sort of financial settlement so
the matter could be disposed. As the prosecutor and defense lawyers began to negotiate, the victim's father requested to speak. He asked: If the
lower court's prison sentence was affirmed, why did its original, levied
compensation award require any adjustment at all? He explained that his
family was poor and struggled to eek out an existence. Lowering the
award, even by just a few hundred rupees, would have a significant impact on him, his wife, and his children. The presiding judge tried to explain to the father the bigger picture of why it was important not to clog
the High Court with matters that could be easily resolved here in the Lok
Adalat. But the father, although timid in the way he spoke, remained
resolute. He would not agree to any reduction in compensation and if the
case needed to be sent back to the High Court for a final decision, then
so be it. Angered that no compromise could be reached, the presiding
Lok Adalat judge adjourned the matter and ordered the parties to resolve their dispute in the regular state court.
In spite of the low number of settlements that occurred during
Krishnan's visit to the High Court Lok Adalat, state Legal Services Authority officials hastened to point out that this day was an anomaly. According to these officials, 2003 has been a banner year; in particular,
between January I and May 31 nearly 3000 cases have settled, with total
awards reaching over half a million rupees." ' Moreover, the staff at the
Legal Services office proudly displayed to Krishnan the year-by-year total of excise settlements dating back to 2ooo. Table 2 illustrates the results.

16o. For years the courts-despite heavy criticism from women's rights and civil rights groupshave deemed Section 354 as compoundable and thus eligible for Lok Adalat adjudication. This is the
reason that, procedurally, the case could come before the High Court Lok Adalat. Id.
161. Interview with Legal Services Authority (July 30, 2003).
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TABLE 262
YEAR-BY-YEAR TOTAL OF EXCISE SETTLEMENTS DATING BACK TO 2000
YEAR

NUMBER OF EXCISE CASES

TOTAL AMOUNT OF MONEY

SET LED BY

AWARDED (RUPEES) BY

HIGH COURT LOK ADALAT

HIGH COURT LOK ADALAT

2000

44,8io

19,373,021

2001

46,332

14,512,905

2002

10,214

2,049,100

2914

540,635

2003

(Jan. I-May 31)

Upon closer scrutiny the data prove to be quite perplexing. We see
that in its first year, 2000, the High Court Lok Adalat settled nearly
45,000 cases, and dispatched almost 20,oo0,0o0 rupees in awards. Just two
years later though, in 2002, the number of cases settled dropped to about
io,ooo and the awards issued fell to slightly over 2,000,000 rupees. If the
first six months of 2003 are indicative, this year will be the lowest number
of cases settled by the High Court Lok Adalat and the lowest amount of
money awarded. Of course because the data from the Legal Services office are incomplete in many ways, we are left with more questions than
answers. For example, what percentage of cases that come before this
Lok Adalat are actually settled? Could it be that, in 2000, ninety-five percent of the cases were settled, whereas in 2002 settlements occurred only
ten percent of the time-or vice versa? Are fewer cases settled today because there are fewer disputes, fewer claimants willing to agree to a settlement, greater lawyer-obstinacy to work within these forums, or
something else?
The incomplete nature of the data collection was not restricted to
the High Court Lok Adalat. Consider how the records bureau located
inside the capital city's Civil Court Complex functions. This office keeps
statistics on the activities of other types of Lok Adalats in the capital district. The staff provided Krishnan with access to a variety of records from
2002. For example, according to their data, last year a Criminal Lok Adalat that met 192 times settled 1090 criminal matters.' 6' But when asked
how many petty criminal cases were referred to the Criminal Lok Adalat,
no one could provide an answer. Krishnan then went to observe how the
Criminal Lok Adalat operated and it became apparent why the records
office had no data on case-referrals. For one thing, the Criminal Lok
Adalat is a dispute settlement body in name only. In reality all this forum
162. Id.
163. Interview with Record Bureau staff (July 24, 2003).
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does is to sign off on pre-arranged settlements reached between the state
and the charged defendant.' 6'
The proceeding takes place in the criminal courthouse, located
about three miles away from the capital city's Civil Complex, specifically
within the office of a criminal court judge (known as the metropolitan
magistrate). The judge is at his desk while a female advocate, who serves
as the titular second member of this "judicial panel," sits on the other
side. There is no third member present. This Lok Adalat meets up to
three times a week where between forty and fifty cases are disposed of in
each session. 6, One-by-one, a defendant enters the judge's office escorted by a police officer. A clerk presents the judge with the defendant's
file that explains the plea agreement reached with the state. The judge
signs off on the matter and the case is reported as "settled." This episode
takes just seconds to complete; once the judge signs the necessary forms,
the defendant exits (presumably to jail or to pay a fine) and the next defendant comes in and the same process is repeated. That the Legal Services office finds no reason to maintain statistics on the number of cases
that are referred to the Criminal Lok Adalat is understandable in view of
this forum's one hundred percent "settlement" rate.
As an institution, the Criminal Lok Adalat acts more as an administrative rubberstamp than as a dispute resolution forum. There are no
lawyers or prosecutors present. There is no contestation of facts or negotiations regarding the terms of the settlement. Krishnan was informed
that meetings between the defendant and the prosecutor obviously do
occur prior to the Criminal Lok Adalat judge signing off on the plea
agreement.' 66 And, furthermore, he was told that not all of the pleabargaining meetings resulted in compromise. However, the Legal Services Authority office does not keep statistics of what transpires within
these plea-bargaining meetings.' 67 We do not know, for example, what
percentage of compoundable cases is settled beforehand and what percentage is tried. The district Legal Services office only records (and highlights) the supposed success rate of the cases "settled" within the
Criminal Lok Adalat.
It is unclear why records for the Criminal Lok Adalat are kept in this
manner. In civil matters the record keeping tends to be a bit more detailed but it too remains incomplete. For example, the Legal Services office noted that last year within the capital district 132 out of 283 civil and

164.
165.
166.
167.

Krishnan observed the Criminal Lok Adalat on July 26, 2003.
Interview with Presiding Judge of Criminal Lok Adalat (July 26, 2003).

Id.
Interview with the Legal Services Authority (July 24, 2003).
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family law cases settled in pre-Lok Adalat negotiation meetings.' 6 Yet
there was no breakdown on the types of civil matters settled or whether
any litigants by passed the pre-Lok Adalat meeting and went directly to
the Lok Adalat itself. Separately kept statistics for 2002, added more
confusion:
460 out of 51o divorce cases were settled in the Lok Adalat;
i68 out of 200 motor vehicle accident cases were settled in the Lok
Adalat; and that
142 out of 200 "other civil
69 matters" (mainly property disputes) were
settled in the Lok Adalat.'
Furthermore, the Legal Services office had other rather puzzling
data. In Bank Adalats-dispute resolution forums intended to bring
about compromise between customers who have a grievance against the
Bank of India-only I8I out of the 8oo cases settled in 2002."' ° In contrast, the district's Water Company Adalat, which hears cases from individuals with complaints against the city's Metro Water Supply and
Sewage Board, received 152 cases in 2002 and settled 123 of them.'7 ' The
office also noted that thousands of cases have been settled in Jail Adalats-forums that occur in the jail cell of inmates who have been accused
of committing a petty criminal offense but who lack the resources to post
bail and thus have languished in custody for, in some cases, years.'72 And
once every three months the district Legal Services office holds a "megaLok Adalat," which is a one day camp organized at the city's central
sports stadium where anywhere from 800o to io,ooo cases are brought.
Krishnan was told that, on average,
the settlement rate at these mega73
Lok Adalats is about fifty percent.'
Yet how do we interpret any of these data? Along with the questions
raised above, other issues come to mind. For example, how satisfied are
the claimants that participate in Bank Adalats, Water Company Adalats,
Jail Adalats, or mega-Lok Adalats-even when a settlement is reached?
How effectively are the parties' claims being presented? Do lawyers act
strategically vis-d-vis the judges as we witnessed above? Are judges the
dominant figures parsing out justice as they see fit? And perhaps most
importantly, has the desire for increasing the number of cases settled so
consumed those working within the process that they have lost focus on
the substantive, concrete concerns of the average claimant?
i68. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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The evidence we have gathered and the queries we raise do place
into question the ultimate fairness of Lok Adalats. As we have found, the
Lok Adalat is not a single institution, but a cluster of kindred institutions.
Not only are new variants evolving, but, within each, those who operate
them are improvising and new patterns are emerging. In spite of the traditionalistic reference of the name, there is little drawing on indigenous
practices; in spite of the populist rhetoric, there is no evident community
input or participative character to the proceedings. These institutions
tend to operate in a top-down fashion-scheduling, location, personnel,
and agendas are all decided by the authorities who occupy their positions
by virtue of state connections. These forums are dominated by judges
both as organizers and presiders. Correspondingly, the role of lawyers is
notably diminished compared to the regular courts. With little lawyer input and no recourse to appeal, presiding officers enjoy far greater discretion than in regular state courts. Judges may be paternalistic,
overbearing, or perfunctory in dealing with individual parties. They are
not, however, necessarily more deliberative. Yet there are those who no
doubt will be very critical of our findings and these questions we raise.
We sketch our critics' likely rebuttal in the next section. As we conclude,
however, this point of view does little to blunt our concern about how
Lok Adalats are functioning in modern India.
CONCLUSION

A.

Is GOOD (ENOUGH) JUSTICE... Is INDIAN JUSTICE
Since we first began our investigation of Lok Adalats nearly two
years ago, we have faced recurrent criticism from their defenders.'74 Critics have accused us of viewing Lok Adalats through a Western, even colonial lens, reminding us that India is not the United States, Britain, or
Canada. Applying the standards we would use in the West to the Indian
legal system is taken as an indication of insensitivity to cultural dynamics
and as evidence of hubris.
According to these defenders, Lok Adalats need to be contextualized within the larger framework of India's legal system. The Lok Adalat
was created to restore access to remedies and protections and to alleviate
the institutional burden of millions of petty cases clogging the regular
"GRUFF" JUSTICE

174. It should be noted that our critics' argument, which we set forth in this section, has been ex-

pressed to us in verbal fashion. We have presented our findings and hypotheses to judges and lawyers
in India and this has been their reaction to our claims. To date, we have not found anything in writing
that captures their views that we are presenting here. This section thus isa summary that we hope does
justice to our critics' position.
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courts.'75 Recall that there are many obstacles within the regular courtsparticularly the lower courts-preventing disputants from receiving
speedy, accessible justice. The most important aspect of the Lok Adalat
is that it offers the aggrieved claimant, whose case would otherwise sit in
the regular courts for decades, at least some compensation now. We have
to remember, these proponents argue, that in the big picture the cases
that come before the Lok Adalats are rather petty. Although to the individual claimant her case has enormous personal significance, in most
cases the claims are' usually for small amounts of money and involve relatively minor issues. 76
Even assuming that Lok Adalats throughout India operate as they
do in the sites we observed-where cases are reviewed quickly and
judges tend to act in a unilateral (if not harsh) manner-this is acceptable. The presiding judge of a Lok Adalat is an experienced adjudicator
with a documented record of public service and has legal acumen. So
even if the judge happens to address claimants gruffly or to treat the issues before him in a seemingly hurried manner, at the end of the day his
decisions are usually on the mark-or at least they are close enough, so
that the parties are better off than they were originally. Regardless of
how gruff and perfunctory the justice dispensed, Lok Adalats improve
the overall legal system. To ignore their contributions is to misunderstand both how justice functions in India and the constraints on the path
to greater access to justice in the future.
We appreciate that many in India share a desperate desire to improve the condition of the legal system. But we question our critics' unabashed acceptance that Lok Adalats-even with their flaws-are better
for the entire legal system than nothing at all. Lok Adalats consume
scarce resources of money, personnel, attention, and energy. These resources might be better employed to address the fundamental problems
facing the courts in India. To persist on the Lok Adalat track without
critical examination of its costs and alternatives strikes us as manifesting
175. Defenders also credit Lok Adalats with reducing the frequency of "under the table negotiations." Anyone familiar with how things work in India, the argument goes, knows that when a claimant
has a grievance against, for example, a governmental electricity company or a similar agency, an easy
way to resolve the dispute is quietly to bribe the relevant state official to fix the problem. Although by
no means eliminating this behavior, the Lok Adalat provides an opportunity for claimants who disdain
such corruption to pursue their cases within a legitimate judicial setting.
176. If the case is financially significant there is always the option of turning to arbitration, which
in India is a formal, alternative dispute forum designed to handle large claims where large amounts of
money are at stake. But even here, an agreement only goes into effect where both parties agree to the
proposed terms set forth by the arbitrator. In 1996, India passed the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, which sought to update the Arbitration Act of 194o. One of the most important aspects of the
1996 law is that it significantly reduces the ability of parties to set aside the arbitration agreement
through litigation in the regular state courts.
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all unwarranted pessimism about the possibilities for court reform that
truly enhances access to justice.
B.

LOK ADALATS AS A MOVING TARGET

We anticipate that there will be further extensions and enlargements
of the Lok Adalat cluster and perhaps refinements and cutbacks as well.
Within the past year there have been additional statutory initiatives to
bolster the Lok Adalat. In 2002, Parliament enacted a new set of amendments to the Indian Civil Procedure Code. Among them, Section 89
enlarges the power of courts to refer cases to Lok Adalats.'" Section 89
reads:
(i)Where it appears to the court that there exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, the court shall formulate
the terms of the settlement and give them to the parties for their observations and after receiving the observations of the parties, the court
may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same
for(a) arbitration;
(b) conciliation;
(c) judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat;
or

(d) mediation.
(2) Where a dispute has been referred(a) for arbitration or conciliation, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply as if the proceedings
for arbitration or conciliation were referred for settlement under
the provisions of that Act;
(b) to Lok Adalat, the court shall refer the same to the Lok Adalat in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (i) of Section
20 of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and all other provisions of that Act shall apply in respect of the dispute so referred to
the Lok Adalat;
(c) for judicial settlement, the court shall refer the same to a suitable institution or person and such institution or person shall be
deemed to be a Lok Adalat and all the provisions of the Legal
Services Authority Act, 1987 [39 of 1987] shall apply as if the dispute were referred to a Lok Adalat under the provisions of that
Act;
(d) for mediation, the court shall effect a compromise between the
parties and shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed. 178

177. INDIAN CODE CIV. PROC. § 89.
178. Id.
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Under one plausible reading of Section 89 a court now has the
power to steer cases into Lok Adalats, accompanied by the judge's formulation of a resolution, whenever the judge believes that a settlement
between the disputing parties is possible, even if the parties do not share
this opinion or consent to the transfer. Presumably if a settlement were
not arranged in the Lok Adalat, the case would return to the docket of
the court. But this understanding is rendered problematic by another
new provision, an amendment to the Legal Services Authority Act
("LSAA") added by Parliament in 2002.' Section 22D of the LSAA
states:
The Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under the Act, be guided by
the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other
principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 19o8 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
At least some Lok Adalats are thus authorized to go beyond arranging settlements to "decid[e] ...a dispute on merit," and they are given
broad discretion to do this according to their general notions of justice.I 8'
Even without this extension of the mandate as mediators, Lok Adalat
judges already possess power that seems overbearing and coercive to the
parties before them-especially poor and unrepresented parties."2
The Indian Bar Council has been very critical of 22D particularly for
allowing Lok Adalats to rule now on the merits of cases without the
agreement of the parties. Further, many Indian lawyers worry that a
claimant seeking justice in the regular state courts might end up having
her case transferred without her consent to a Lok Adalat (via Section 89
of the Code of Civil Procedure). And once in the Lok Adalat, the claimant may then have a judgment "on merit" issued against her, which un179. C.I.S. Part 11-A (2002), Legal Services Authority (Amendment) Act, 2002, Indian Parliament
Act No. 37 of 2002, New Delhi, June 11,2002.

18o. Id. The invocation of "justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice" is
reminiscent of the formula "justice, equity and good conscience" which was the residual source of law
in British India. See Derrett, supra note 84.
18i. The new Section 22D formula. "justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of
justice" (again reminiscent of the "justice, equity, and good conscience" formula, see Derrett, supra
note 84) differs significantly from the formula embedded in Section 20(4) of the Legal Services Authority Act which specifies that the Lok Adalat should pursue "a compromise or settlement between
the parties" and in doing so "shall be guided by legal principles and the principles of justice, equity,
and fair play."
182. The coercive potential of mediation in developing societies has been especially highlighted by
Professor Sally Merry some years back. See Sally Merry, The Social Organizationof Mediation in NonIndustrial Societies: Implicationsfor Informal Community Justice in America, in THE PoLITIcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 8. at 17. As opposed to the mediators in Professor Merry's study, Lok
Adalat judges have wielded-and with Section 22D in effect will probably continue to wield-their

power with little to no check.
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der Section 22E of the Legal Services Authority Act would be "final and
binding"'' 3 with no appeal.
In December 2002, lawyers across much of India went on strike to
protest these amendments.'" In addition, the protestors filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court seeking to invalidate Section 22D. In a short
but confusing judgment the Court dismissed the petition and upheld the
amendments as free of any constitutional infirmity.'58 The Court went on
to state that the amendments to the LSAA, including Section 22D, would
take effect once "Permanent Lok Adalats" were "set up at an early
date."' 6 What "Permanent Lok Adalats" means is unclear. From reading
both the 2002 amendments of the Legal Services Authority Act, as well
as the Court's judgment, it appears as though no Permanent Lok Adalats
have yet been established in India. Presumably such Permanent Lok
Adalats would be confined to matters dealing with public utilities. But
this turns out to be a potentially elastic category, including not only
transport services, postal, telegraph and telephone services, electric and
water services, sanitation, hospital, and insurance services, but also "any
service which the Central or State Governments... may in the public in' s
terest.., declare to be a public utility for purposes of this chapter."'
Recall that according to the statute that created the Pension Lok Adalats, these forums were to be a "permanent and continuous body." So, is
it possible now for Pension Lok Adalats to issue non-appealable judgments on the merits of a case? Might other Lok Adalats be assimilated to
the "Permanent" and "public utility" categories? Judges and lawyers
with whom Krishnan spoke expressed differing views on the exact impact
of the Court ruling and of the new amendments. Needless to say, more
research (and clarification from judges and government officials) is required before knowing how these amendments and this judgment will affect those pursuing legal claims.
These recent events underline the extent to which the scope and
powers of Lok Adalats and their relation to other legal institutions remain fluid and unresolved. Such changes represent a series of improvisations by proponents trying to strengthen and extend what they perceive
as a promising institutional initiative. At a conference on access to justice
in New Delhi in November 2002, Galanter spoke about Lok Adalats with
a number of High Court and Supreme Court judges. Almost uniformly
183. Legal Services Authority Act § 22E (2002).
184. For a discussion of this strike, see J. Venkatesan, Lawyers Defy SC, Strike Work, HINDU,
Dec. 19, 2002, available at2002 WL 104070994.

I85. Pandey v. Union of India, Writ Petition 543/2002.
i86. Id.
187. Legal Services Authority Act § 22A (2002).
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they regarded Lok Adalats as a signal success. As one judge put it, in a
twist on Marie Antoinette, they are "bread for the poor. Later they can
have cake."' s On the other hand, critics see in these moves portents of a
dismantling of legality in favor of paternalistic, intuitive, "kadi justice"
for the poor.'89 The absence of appeals, the exclusion of lawyers, and the
shift of decisional standards from "legal principles" to "principles of justice" suggest a major enlargement of the presiding judge's discretion and
a robust faith that the poor have more to gain from benign paternalism
than from juristic or popular legality.
Each side the argument relies on assertions about the working of
Lok Adalats that are based on supposition rather than investigation. We
hope that research of the kind we propose will help to transform the debate, and the further development of the Lok Adalat institution, into an
exchange in which aspirations for access to justice are tested by empirical
observation and analysis.

188. Interview with judicial officer, New Delhi, India (Nov. 2002).
189. "Kadi justice" here refers not to the actual practice of Muslim kadis (qadis, kazis) but to Max
Weber's use of the term kadijustiz "to describe the administration of justice which is oriented not at
fixed rules of formally rational law but at the ethical, religious, political, or otherwise expediential pos-

tulates of substantively rational law." M.

RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

213, n.48 (1954). An Indian synonym is "banyan tree justice."
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NUMBER OF JUDGES, COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES
JUDGES"
COMMON LAW COUNTRIES

'

JUDGES PER
100,000 CAPITA

UNITED STATES

1998

28,049

10.4

ENGLAND & WALES

2001

3,518

6.6

CANADA

1991

1,817

6.5

MALAYSIA

1990

274

1.6

INDIA

1995

9,564

1.0

YEAR

JUDGES

CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES

JUDGES PER
100,000 CAPITA

GERMANY

1995

22,134

27.1

DENMARK

1997

653

12.4

FRANCE

1997

6,287

10.7

TAIWAN

1995

1,252

5.7

SOUTH KOREA

1995

1,212

2.7

JAPAN

1999

2,949

2.3

For a discussion of this table, consult footnote

2.

19o. All population estimates from the U.S. census bureau web site. U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base Summary Demographic Data, at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html (data
updated July 17, 2003). England and Wales population estimated at eighty-nine percent of United
Kingdom population.
191. DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, Judicial Appointments, at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
judapp.htm (as of Dec. I, 2003) (England and Wales); Debra Cohen & Sandra Longtin, World
Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjcan.txt (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (Canada); PISTOR, supra note I, at 246 (Malaysia, India, Taiwan, and South Korea);
European Research Network on Judicial Statistics, Working Papers. Bologna: Edizioni Scientifiche
(Germany); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION. Sixth United Survey
of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 131 (covering the period 1995-1997).
available at http://www.uncjin.org/Statistics/WCTS/WCTS6/Publication.pdf (Denmark); Loic Cadet,
Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and Delay. The French Perspective, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 291,
343 (A.A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) (France); THE SECRETARIAT OF THE JUDICIAL REFORM COUNCIL, The
Japanese Judicial System (July 1999), available at http://kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/o62osystem.html
(Japan).

